Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown
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flight proposal during the spring of the year. 18 As a part of this effort they considered
the best method for reaching space. At a series of meetings to discuss
planning for human-in-space program approaches being developed by U.S.
industry in January–February 1958, NACA officials found:
Proposals fell into two rough categories: (a) a blunt-nose cone or
near-spherical zero-lift high-drag vehicle of a ton to a ton-and-a-half
weight, and (b) a hypersonic glider of the ROBO or Dyna-Soar type.
The first category of vehicles used existing ICBM vehicles as boosters;
the second used more complex and arbitrary multiplex arrangements of
existing large-thrust rocket engines. A number of contractors looked at
the zero-lift high-drag minimum weight vehicle as the obvious expedient
for beating the Russians and the Army into space. Others, notably
Bell, Northrup, and Republic Aviation, set this idea aside as a stunt and
consequently these contractors stressed the more elaborate recoverable
hypersonic glider vehicle as the practical approach to the problems of
flight in space (I-3). 19
By April 1958, NACA engineers had concluded that the first of these options should
become the basis for NACA planning for an initial human spaceflight (I-4). 20
It soon became obvious to all that an early opportunity to launch human
spacecraft into orbit would require the development of blunt-body capsules
launched on modified multistage intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Robert Gilruth recalled one of these decisions:
Because of its great simplicity, the non-lifting, ballistic-type of vehicle
was the front runner of all proposed manned satellites, in my judgment.
There were many variations of this and other concepts under study by
both government and industry groups at that time. The choice involved
considerations of weight, launch vehicle, reentry body design, and to be
honest, gut feelings. Some people felt that man-in-space was only a stunt.
The ballistic approach, in particular, was under fire since it was such a
radical departure from the airplane. It was called by its opponents ‘the
man in the can,’ and the pilot was termed only a ‘medical specimen.’
Others thought it was just too undignified a way to fly. 21
18. Abe Silverstein, Associate Director, NACA, to Langley, “Review of Prospective Langley Report
Entitled “Preliminary Study of a Manned Satellite” by Maxime A. Faget, Benjamine E. Garland, and
James J. Buglia, 7 March 1958; Paul E. Purser, Aeronautical Research Engineer, NACA, Memorandum
for Mr. Gilruth, “Langley Manned-Satellite Program,” 11 April 1958. Folder 18674, NASA Historical
Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
19. Adelbert O. Tischler, Head, Rocket Combustion Section, NACA, Memorandum for
Associate Director, NACA, “Minimum Man-In-Space Proposals Presented at WADC, January 29,
1958 to February 1, 1958,” 10 April 1958. Folder 18674, NASA Historical Reference Collection,
NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
20. Silverstein to NACA, “Review of Prospective Langley Report,” 7 March 1958. Folder 18674, NASA
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
21. Robert R. Gilruth, “Memoir: From Wallops Island to Mercury; 1945–1958,” paper, Sixth