Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

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First Steps into Space: Projects Mercury and Gemini
After the foregoing discussion, the concern was still raised that the importance of
Gemini 4 was to check out the reliability of the space craft for 4 days and project
this reliability for 7 days. EVA there fore might jeopardize getting everything we
should get from Gemini 4. If Gemini 4 does not go for 4 days, then we are in a
very difficult position for 7 days on Gemini 5 and presumably we could not go for
7 days on Gemini 5. The real question is whether or not EVA is important enough
in view of the risk, no matter how slight, of jeopardizing a 4-day Gemini 4 flight
and jeopardizing a 7-day Gemini 5 flight.
Then it was pointed out that if you look at the entire program, EVA is more
logical for Gemini 4. If Gemini 4 lasts 3 days then we should not be concerned
about spacecraft reliability for 7 days. The basic problems are really to check-out
confinement and weightlessness. There fore, Gemini 5 is more important than
Gemini 4 and if there is any chance of reducing total flight time due to EVA, EVA
then logically should be accomplished on Gemini 4 rather than on Gemini 5. Every
guarantee was given to top management that if EVA were approved for Gemini 4,
very firm and adequate instructions would be given covering the procedure.
Mr. Webb, Dr. Dryden and Dr. Seamans then gave careful consideration to the
discussions they had with Dr. Mueller and Dr. Gilruth. In their opinion it was
important, whatever the decision, that there be an adequate explanation to the
public to avoid any unnecessary misunderstanding and to minimize any adverse
reactions. There was a strong feeling to ratify EVA for Gemini 4 in order to get
the maximum out of the flight. There was unanimity in that EVA eventually would
be carried out, but there was some reservation as to whether or not it was the best
judgment to have EVA on Gemini 4 as a risk beyond that which has to be taken. It
was concluded that Dr. Seamans would discuss the matter further with Dr. Mueller
and Dr. Gilruth, in view of the discussions which took place, and that if he did not
care to press for EVA on Gemini 4, such EVA would not be undertaken. However,
if the final discussion led Dr. Seamans to press for EVA in Gemini 4, then it would
be unanimously approved for the flight.
NOTE: Following the meeting, a memorandum from Dr. Seamans to Mr. Webb,
dated May 24, 1965, recommending EVA for the Gemini 4 flight was
approved by Mr. Webb and Dr. Dryden.
[signed]
L.W. Vogel
Executive Officer
Document I-66
Document Title: James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA, Cabinet Report for the
President, “Significance of GT-3, GT-4 Accomplishments,” 17 June 1965.
Source: Folder 18674, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History
Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington DC.