Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown 295
A strong comment was made that it is no more hazardous to do EVA in Gemini
4 than in later flights. The training for EVA on Gemini 4 was adequate and the
only question that was holding up EVA on Gemini 4 was qualification of space suit
equipment. This equipment is now fully qualified.
[3] On the other hand, the thought was raised that most of our thinking to date
is that man’s primary role in space is within the confines of a spacecraft.. We are
trying more to qualify the spacecraft in Gemini 4 than we are EVA. However, it was
noted that EVA is also important to the Apollo program.
It was acknowledged that everything that had been said was correct, but it still
remained a fact that the consequences of failure on Gemini 4 would be more
adverse than the consequences of failure on Gemini 5 or 6. There would be no
reservation about EVA on Gemini 4 if it was absolutely necessary to accomplish the
basic missions of the flight. It is essential to learn more about spacecraft systems
over a 4-day period, and therefore we have an obligation to the Government to be
sure that we qualify the spacecraft.
It was explained that EVA was planned for the second orbit of Gemini 4 which does
create some risk for completing a 4-day flight as opposed to having EVA on one of
the latter orbits. However, there is some concern about the ability of an astronaut to
undertake EVA after 4 days of flight. The trade-off in risks involved in not knowing
the condition of the astronauts after some time in orbit as to what could go wrong
with the mechanical systems involved in EVA argued for EVA on an early orbit.
It was again noted that it was more important to check out the space craft for 4 days
so that it would be possible to extrapolate the guarantee of spacecraft operation
for 7 days.
To a comment that in the eyes of the public Gemini 4 would be a success with
EVA, a statement was made that Gemini 4 with EVA might not neces sarily be
considered a success in the eyes of the decision makers. As a guide to risk taking,
it was suggested that if there was a 90% chance to have a Gemini 4 flight for 4 days
and that with EVA this chance would be only 89%, then we should risk 1% less
chance for a 4-day flight for what can be gained from EVA. However, if a chance
for a 4-day flight would be only 80% with EVA, then this additional 10% possibility
for not having a 4-day flight would not be an adequate trade-off to be gained by
EVA and we should not undertake it on Gemini 4.
It was noted that there was no comparison between the risk between the first
Mercury flight and the Gemini 4 flight. It was recalled how the Air Force had
admonished against the first Mercury flight, but NASA top management decided
to go ahead because this flight was absolutely essen tial to the program. If we
take into consideration the risks still inherent in using the rocket as a means of
propulsion, then every time we use this means of propulsion we should find out
everything that can be found out on the flight.
[4] It was noted that we should not be too concerned about the public reaction in
determining what is the best course of action. The decision as to whether or not
there would be EVA on Gemini 4 should be made in the light of what is best for
the program and should not be influenced by possible public reaction.