Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

710
Project Apollo: Americans to the Moon
Gordon MacDonald who had reservations in that he believed the risks far
outweighed the benefits.
PSAC was favorably disposed to support the mission, but had no firm
recommendation. DOD also generally favors the mission. The Apollo Executives’
reactions have already been reported in previous pages. Dr. Mueller also pointed
out that Bellcomm had been quite negative. Bellcomm’s reasoning was that the
risk of a lunar orbit mission is considerably greater than that for an earth orbit
mission. Bellcomm, therefore, believed that a lunar orbit mission should only be
flown if this made it possible to reduce the total number of flights in the lunar
landing program. If this were not possible, then Bellcomm believed the lunar
orbit mission was not justified.
[6] Dr. Paine indicated that he had hoped that it would be possible to
quantify the risks better than had been done in the course of the briefings. Dr.
Mueller mentioned that we had tried to perform a numerical risk assessment,
but that this had not turned out to be as positive as he had hoped it would be.
However, in generalizing the results, he mentioned that the least cumulative risk
in the lunar landing program resulted from making the minimum number of
flights. Dr. Gilruth rebutted by stating that this is like saying that “the faster you
drive your car, the safer you are because your exposure is less.” Dr. Paine also felt
that Dr. Mueller’s statement was not valid since we will be in the flying business
for a long time to come and we will fly on all Saturn V’s, whether we use them
in the lunar program or not. The general view expressed by many of us was that
the highest probability of success for the lunar landing mission would come from
a progressive buildup of flight experience. We felt that although there is risk in
each manned flight, it was impossible to quantify this risk. Instead, the flight test
program should be based on the best available judgment and experience and
should, of course, be reviewed after each mission. Today’s best indications are that
the sequence of missions, C’ (lunar orbit), D (earth orbit with LM), F (lunar orbit
with LM), and G (lunar landing), would give us the best chance at a successful
lunar landing in this decade.
At the conclusion of these discussions, Dr. Paine convened a smaller
meeting, involving some of his immediate staff, Dr. Mueller, General Phillips, and
the Center Directors. This was followed by a third meeting, involving only Paine,
Newell, and Mueller. At the con clusion of these meetings, Dr. Paine announced
that the Apollo 8 flight would be a lunar orbit mission. This was announced
publicly in a press conference in Washington on Tuesday, November 12, 1968.
Document II-64
TO : M/Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
Date: 11 Nov, 1968
FROM : MA/Apollo Program Director