Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown 709
the mission.
1 As a result of the condenser exit temperature problem on Apollo 7, Pratt & Whitney had first
recommended that we should replace the fuel cells on Spacecraft 103, and on the morning of
November 10, recommended that we should change-out the hydrogen pump motors in order to
install the new higher temperature pinions. Myers and I held a meeting with Pratt & Whitney prior
to the Executives meeting, and after discussing the whole situation in detail, decided that we should
not replace these motors. The reasons for this decision were that: (a) The vibration flushing of the
radiators decreased the probability of the prob lem’s recurrence on Apollo 8; (b) Replacement of the
pinion would only slightly increase the temperature margin, but would not really fix the problem;
and (c) Detailed analyses have indicated that, even under the worst-case conditions of recurrence,
there was no flight safety degra dation, and it was unlikely that the mission would be degraded in any
way. I reported the situation in detail during my briefing at the Executives review. Stu Conley, the
Pratt & Whitney Program Manager, however, still felt that the motors should be replaced. This would
have required breaking into systems that were already checked out, and KSC felt that they could not
guarantee that the systems would not be degraded by so doing.
Joe Gavin, Grumman. Since we have no hardware on this flight, our interest
is only with respect to the overall program. The mission makes a lot of sense. If we
don’t do it on this flight, we should do it anyway. I have no reservations.
Bill Bergen, Space Division, North American Rockwell. I agree that there
are more risks in a lunar orbit mission than in an earth orbit mission. Also, it is
unlikely that we will have as high performance of [5] our systems as we had on
Apollo 7, but I am confident that our systems will perform satisfactorily. Although
there would be less risks with a repeat flight, there are risks with no gain. We
should make the lunar orbit flight.
George Stoner, Boeing. I endorse the recommendation without any
reservations.
Gerry Smiley, GE. We have built up a head of steam in Apollo since we
first started talking about C’. To do anything other than fly a lunar orbit mission
now would set the program back.
The meeting was adjourned with the conclusion that a firm recommendation
to fly the Apollo 8 mission to lunar orbit would be made the next day
to the Acting Administrator.
NASA Management Meeting. November 11, 1968
On November 11, 1968, Dr. Mueller, the Center Directors, General Phillips,
and the Center Program Managers met with Dr. Paine, Dr. Newell, Mr. Shapley,
Mr. Finger, and a large number of staff members to discuss the Apollo 8 flight. The
briefings were the same as those given to the Apollo Executives. The recommendations
by Phillips and each of us were to firmly commit to a lunar orbit flight.
Following the briefings, Dr. Mueller indicated that this situation had
been discussed with STAC, PSAC, DOD, and the Apollo Executives. He pointed
out that STAC members had made a penetrating review of the flight and clearly
understood the risks. Their reaction was a posi tive one, with the exception of