Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

696
Project Apollo: Americans to the Moon
good choice. Kotanchik made a strong point that we should fly with a lightweight
crossbeam in order to get a maximum possible safety factor in the SLA region.
During several discussions with MSFC we determined that this was not possible for
the previously stated reasons concerning the launch vehicle dynamics.
GAEC proposed that LM-2 should not be flown in order to save it for the
drop test program. They suggested instead that we build an LTA-4, consisting of the
LM-9 descent stage with LM-8 ascent stage. However, since this would take another
flight LM out of the program, I concluded that LTA-B would be our best choice.
August 13, 1968. Continued working detailed problems in Houston. A
thorough analysis of configuration differences between 103 and 106 identified
the high gain antenna as the most critical item. However, Kraft indicated that
it would be possible to fly the mission even if the high gain antenna should fail
during the flight. There were no “show stoppers” in any of the spacecraft systems
and, in fact, only minor changeouts would have to be made to bring the spacecraft
into a position to fly the proposed mission.
Kraft had reviewed all of the operational elements and determined that
there would be no insurmountable difficulties. The available launch window will
be from December 20 to December 26 (with the exception of December 25). In
early January a launch window with an Atlantic injection would become available,
and toward the end of January another Pacific injection window would open up.
[6] Slayton had decided to assign the 104 crew to this mission (Borman,
Lovell and Anders, backed up by Armstrong, Aldrin and Haise) in order to
minimize possible effects on the D mission. Slayton had talked to Borman on
Saturday and found him to be very much interested in making this flight.
August 14, 1968. Went to Washington with Gilruth, Kraft and Slayton to
meet with Paine, Phillips, Hage, Schneider and Bowman from Headquarters; von
Braun, James and Richard from Marshall; and Debus and Petrone from KSC. The
meeting started with an MSC review of spacecraft, flight operations, and flight
crew support for the proposed mission. I reviewed the Spacecraft 103 hardware
configuration, the proposed LM substitute, consumable requirements, and the
proposed alternate mission. Copies of the charts used in this review are attached.
[not included]
Kraft indicated that there were no major problems with either the MSFN
or the Mission Control Center and flight operations. He discussed the launch
window constraints and indicated that NASA management would have to get with
the Department of Defense in order to obtain recovery support. Our conclusion
was that we should go for the December 20, 1968, launch window with a built-in
two week hold prior to the launch. Then, if it is logistically possible to shift to the
Atlantic insertion period, we should try for the January 3, 1969, launch window if
we miss the December launch window. If this is not feasible, we would have to go
from the December 20 date to the January 20 date.
MSFC indicated that there were no significant difficulties with the launch
vehicle to support this mission. We agreed that LTA-B would be loaded for a total