Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown 695
MSC’s main concern in volved possible differences between CSM 103 and CSM
106, which was the first one that had been scheduled to leave earth orbit, and
finding a substitute for the LM for this flight.
The Huntsville meeting ended at 5 p.m. with an agreement to get together
in Washington on August 14, 1968. At that time the assembled group planned to
make a decision as to whether to proceed with these plans or not. If the decision
was affirmative, Phillips would immediately leave for Vienna to discuss the plans
with Mueller and Webb, since it would be most important to move out as quickly
as possible once the plan was adopted. It was also agreed to classify the planning
stage of this activity secret, but it was proposed that, as soon as the Agency had
adopted the plan, it should be fully disclosed to the public.
August 9, 1968 - 8:30 p.m. After returning to Houston, held a meeting
with Kleinknecht, Bolender, Dale Myers of NR, and George Abbey. We agreed to
move out as described earlier with a view toward identifying any difficulties over
the weekend. Bolender immediately left for Bethpage to discuss the proposal with
GAEC and to find the best possible LM substitute. Myers returned to Downey to
work the problem from that end.
August 10, 1968. No difficulties identified as yet. Kleinknecht is defining
detailed configuration differences between CSM 103 and 106, and the most
outstanding difficulty will probably be in the area of the high gain antenna.
(This was known at the time the plan was discussed on August 9.) Insofar as a
LM substitute is concerned, it looks as though LM-2 might be able to support this
flight. Kotanchik, however, made a strong point that we should not fly a LM but
install a simple crossbeam instead. He indicated that if a residual Pogo problem
remained, it would be best not to have a LM on this flight; and if Pogo were solved,
the LM would not be necessary. I dis cussed this with Hage in Washington and
Richard at MSFC. Both agreed that a high-fidelity LM would not be necessary but
that a mass representation might be required to avoid Saturn V control systems
dynamics problems.
I also discussed the proposed mission with Bill Bergen, who appeared less
receptive than most of the people who had been exposed to this plan.
[5] August 12, 1968. Held many meetings and telephone con versations on the
subject of the new mission during the day.
Kraft indicated that the biggest constraint was the launch window; a
December 20 launch would be required if a daylight launch was desired. (All
agreed that for the first manned Saturn V flight a daylight launch would be a
requirement.) We thought it would be best to plan for a December 1 launch
and build in a “hold” period until December 20 to give maximum assurance of
meeting that date.
In the area of a LM substitute, LTA-B appeared on the scene. This test article
had been through the dynamic test vehicle program at MSFC and was now stored
at KSC, ready for an unmanned 503 launch. It has the proper mass distribution
and is in a flight-ready condition. All except Kotanchik agreed that this would be a