Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

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Project Apollo: Americans to the Moon
from his central perspective. These notes, which were supplemented by official documents, form
an invaluable record of space policy and management actions from 1967 until Low left NASA
in 1976. In his August and November 1968 notes, Low narrates the series of events and
decisions that led to the decision to fly Apollo 8 around the Moon. Perhaps most remarkable
were the events of 9 August, which began with a brief conversation about the desirability of
such a decision between Low and the Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center Robert Gilruth
and, by the time the day was over, involved key Apollo decision makers in Houston, Huntsville,
and Washington. When NASA Administrator James Webb and Head of Manned Space Flight
George Mueller, who were attending a United Nations Conference in Vienna, Austria, heard
of the Apollo 8 plan, they were taken quite aback, and insisted that no decision be announced
until after the Apollo 7 mission, which was to test the post-fire Apollo Command and Service
Modules in Earth orbit. Although final approval of the preliminary decisions taken that day
would be months in coming, it is remarkable that the basics of such a momentous choice could
be put in place in just a few hours on one day, and then put in motion a few days later.
The Apollo 8 lunar orbit mission was designated C’ (C Prime) because it was inserted in
the previously planned Apollo mission sequence which included the following missions:
C – test of the Apollo Command and Service module in low Earth orbit; D – test of the
Apollo Command and Service and Lunar Modules in low Earth orbit; E – test of the Apollo
Command and Service and Lunar Modules in a mission beyond Earth orbit, but not headed
to the moon; F – test of all equipment in lunar orbit; and G – lunar landing mission.
There is no mention in any of these documents of any concern that the Soviet Union might be
able to fly a cosmonaut crew around the M oon before the United States was able to send its
astronauts to the lunar vicinity, even though intelligence estimates and several 1968 flights
of the Soviet “Zond” spacecraft suggested that such a mission might be in preparation.
In addition to Low’s notes, documents included here are reservations about the wisdom of
undertaking the mission raised by Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George
Mueller, Apollo Program Manager Lieutenant General Sam Phillip’s memoranda making the
changes in mission plans that would allow the circumlunar choice and formally recommending
approval of the circumlunar Apollo 8 mission, and NASA Acting Administrator Thomas
Paine’s memorandum documenting his decision to approve that recommendation.
Document II-60
SPECIAL NOTES FOR AUGUST 9, 1968, AND SUBSEQUENT
Background:
June, July 1968. The current situation in Apollo was that LM - 3 had been
delivered to KSC somewhat later than anticipated; and CSM 103 would be delivered
to KSC in late July. Checkout of 101 at KSC was proceeding well, and a launch in
the Fall of 1968 appeared to be assured. There was every reason to believe that 103
would also be a mature spacecraft but that for many reasons LM-3 might run into
difficulties. Certification tests of LM were lagging; there were many open failures;
and the number of changes and test failures at KSC was quite large.