Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

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Project Apollo: Americans to the Moon
decision at this time to abandon the goal of attempting to achieve manned lunar
landing in this decade.
Opposing it, the point can be made that some degree of slippage in
present schedules is recognized to be inevitable, so that eliminating the present
margin between the current scheduled first manned lunar landing [8] attempts
(late CY 1968) and the end of the decade would be tantamount to and generally
recognized as an admission that achievement of the goal has been deferred
beyond the end of the decade.
Recommendations
(Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences
or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA;
Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions)
* * * * * * * * *
3. Should a 1964 supplemental estimate be submitted to Congress
in January for restoration in part or in full of the $250 million congressional
reductions below the total legislative authorizations for NASA in 1964?
Alternatives
a. Decide to submit a 1964 supplemental in the amount required to keep
the MLLP on the current schedules. Arguments that can be made for this course
include:
(1) That restoration of 1964 funds is necessary to avoid forced
slippage in the program; and
(2) That submission of a supplemental estimate would once again place
the question of maintaining the pace in the MLLP squarely before Congress.
b. Decide not to submit a 1964 supplemental estimate to Congress,
and accept as the will of Congress whatever slippage in the MLLP is caused by
insufficient funds in 1964. Arguments for this course include:
(1) It would avoid placing the administration in the untenable
[9] budgetary posture of seeking restoration of the NASA reduction so soon
after congressional action without making similar requests for other important
programs reduced by Congress;
(2) There is no reason to believe that the Congress will look with
more favor on a supplemental estimate than it did on the regular 1964 request;
(3) The outcome of a supplemental request is likely to be uncertain
for several months, and the uncertainty will create operating difficulties which will
tend to offset the advantages even if the supplemental is ultimately approved; and
(4) Congress has taken the responsibility for slippage in the MLLprogram
because of insufficient funds in 1964.
c. Decide not to submit a 1964 supplemental estimate but to seek to make
up in the 1965 budget the amounts required to adhere to the current MLLP
schedules insofar as practicable. The arguments for this alternative are:
(1) It avoids the problems of a 1964 supplemental estimate referred
to above [Items (1), (2), and (3) under “b” above];
(2) It offers a possibility of minimizing the impact of congressional
1964 reductions on the MLLP through adjustments in the timing of obligations
between 1964 and 1965; and