Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown 621
c. Decide now to abandon both current work toward the manned lunar
landing objective and the development of the Saturn V large launch vehicle.
If the programs involved are cancelled or adjusted in January 1964, savings
approaching $2.5 billion in 1965 NOA and expenditures could be anticipated.
The arguments supporting this alternative could include, [6] in addition to those
for alternative “b” above:
(1) That proceeding with development of the Saturn V launch
vehicle is not justified in the absence of approved goals requiring its use; and
(2) That an adequate continuing space program can be built
around the use of the Saturn IB (and perhaps the Titan III) launch vehicle.
Recommendations
(Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences
or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA;
Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions)
* * * * * * * * *
2. Does the present-program represent the minimum necessary for
achieving the_MLL goal?
Discussion: The review has pointed to the conclusions:
a. That the elements comprising the present program (with Saturn I
manned flights eliminated) are required for achieving the goal (recognizing
the somewhat indirect contribution of the Gemini program), except for certain
construction and other relatively minor items in which adjustments are under
consideration in the regular budget review; and
b. That the current NASA 1964 and 1965 estimates represent the
minimum funding level required to continue the program on the schedule now
planned, except for the possible adjustments being considered in the regular
budget review.
[7]
Alternatives
a. Approve the program and cost estimates as submitted by NASA,
subject to separate resolution of the adjustments under consideration in the
budget review. (The question of a 1964 supplemental estimate is considered in
Item 3 below.)
b. Decide now that the program should be geared to a schedule slipping
the first manned lunar landing attempts one or two years later than now planned
to the very end of the decade (i.e., end of CY 1969 or l970, depending on the
definition of “decade”). This alternative might permit reductions in the range
of $100 to 200 million in the 1965 budget. Other things being equal, the total
cost of the MLLP to the achievement of the first manned lunar landing would
probably be greater by at least $200 million because of the need to maintain
the same engineering and other overhead costs over a longer period. However,
this would probably not mean a corresponding increase in total annual budgets
over what they would be under the present schedule, since expected successor
programs would then consume the funds that would otherwise go for completing
the stretched out MLLP.
In support of this alternative it could be argued that it would recognize
the need for minimizing outlays in the 1965 budget without necessitating a