Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in ... - The Black Vault

Exploring the Unknown
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able to complete the effort (I-26). 85 This two-month procurement process, from
start to contract award, deserves special notice as something of a speed record
with respect to the convoluted manner in which the federal government buys
everything from paperclips to nuclear powered aircraft carriers. In the end, the
Mercury project would cost approximately $350 million for research and development
as well as operations. 86
McDonnell’s Mercury team, under the leadership of John F. Yardley, immediately
began wrestling with Faget’s requirements. It had a good start on the capsule
from work done the year before for the Air Force, but Yardley was unprepared
for the difficulties encountered when actually building the spacecraft. First and
most important, Yardley’s team struggled with strict weight requirements so that
the capsule could be launched atop the Atlas rocket. NASA’s specifications for the
capsule had been 2,000 pounds placed in orbit. McDonnell’s bid had proposed
a 2,400-pound spacecraft, plus or minus 25 percent. The minus side allowed a
capsule of 1,800 pounds, perfect for the capability of the Atlas, but anything
over 2,000 pounds could not be put into orbit by the envisioned launcher. A
combination of paring the capsule design down to the lightest weight possible
and increasing the thrust of the Atlas finally made successful launches in Project
Mercury attainable, but it was a difficult task and the capability margins were
always stretched. Everyone was keenly aware of this and other problems in building
the spacecraft. Wernher von Braun wrote a friendly letter to Robert Gilruth
about McDonnell’s performance. “It has come to my attention that one of our
ball carriers has his shoelaces untied and doesn’t know it,” he wrote. “If he trips
and falls we may all lose the game and our astronaut his life. So I feel that I must
pass along to you what has been brought to my attention, at the risk of making a
few people sore” (I-27). 87 In response to such concerns, teams of NASA engineers
swarmed over contractors in an effort to keep the program on track.
For the next year the NASA/McDonnell engineering team worked through
the critical components of the spacecraft. They focused on the four major elements
of any flying machine:
• Aerodynamics/stability and control
• Avionics/electronics
• Propulsion
• Materials
In addition, they had the critical area of human factors to oversee in the
development of this entirely new type of spacecraft. 88 One of the McDonnell engi­
85. Cost had long been an issue, even before the McDonnell contract. See A. J. Goodpaster, Brigadier
General, USA, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 29 September 1959. Folder 18674, NASA
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
86. President’s Science Advisory Committee, “Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space,”
14 November 1960 (final report 16 December 1960). Folder 18674, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
87. Wernher von Braun, Director, Development Operations Division, NASA, to Robert R.
Gilruth, Space Task Group, NASA, 9 October 1959. Folder 18674, NASA Historical Reference
Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
88. George M. Low, Program Chief, Manned Spaceflight, NASA, Memorandum for Administrator,
NASA, “Status Report No. 1, Manned Satellite Project,” 9 December 1958. Folder 18674, NASA