LSI 2010 NRD Santa Fe final conference binder 072110.pdf
LSI 2010 NRD Santa Fe final conference binder 072110.pdf LSI 2010 NRD Santa Fe final conference binder 072110.pdf
Allan Kanner of Kanner & Whiteley, L.L.C. Speaker 23: 52 Orange” manufacturers, claiming injuries resulting from exposure to the chemical defoliant. 204 The defendants argued that the case should be removed pursuant to § 1442, asserting the government contractor defense and immunity under the DPA. 205 Although the court ruled that the DPA was a “colorable” defense for purposes of removal, the court questioned the validity of such claims of immunity, stating “[t]here is a dispute as to whether section 707 [of the DPA] provides immunity against tort suits based in strict liability and negligence of the sort the civilian plaintiffs wish to pursue. On a previous occasion, this court was inclined to view section 707 as immunizing contractors only for contract damages, although it did not rule on the issue.” 206 The “previous occasion” referenced by the Ryan court, was the Eastern District of New York’s decision in In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, in which the defendant manufacturers argued that, under the DPA, they should not be held liable for complying with “Agent Orange” production contracts entered into with the United States government. 207 As noted in Ryan, the Agent Orange court held that immunity under the DPA did not necessarily extend to liability for torts: It is indisputable that the statutory ancestors of section 707 only immunized contractors from liability for breach of contract damages; the law was explicit on that point . . . It is telling that neither the Defense Production Act itself nor the legislative history made any reference to tort claims despite the fact that, as evidenced by this suit, the contracts “rated” under the Act “involve items, the production of which may . . . give[e] rise to the possibility of an enormous amount of claims. If section 707 is to be applied to tort claims at all, it should only be read to bar claims for strict liability, not negligence. The former involve holding a defendant liable despite the fact that it may not have been at fault and the liability thus truly “result[s] . . . from compliance with . . . this Act.” Whether this last 204 781 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 205 Id. at 938. 206 Id. at 945. 207 597 F. Supp. 740, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). © 50 Law Seminars International | Natural Resource Damages | 07/16/10 in Santa Fe, NM
Allan Kanner of Kanner & Whiteley, L.L.C. Speaker 23: 53 interpretation or one not applying section 707 to tort suits altogether is adopted, the Defense Production Act would not bar plaintiffs’ claims. 208 Similarly, in Hercules, Inc. v. United States, the federal circuit examined the scope of immunity of section 707 of the DPA. In Hercules, manufacturers sued the United States government in order to recover expenses incurred as a result of Agent Orange litigation. 209 The defendants argued that because the government had compelled them to enter into contracts for the production of “Agent Orange” pursuant to section 101 of the DPA, the defendants were entitled to immunity under section 707 for both contract and tort suits. 210 The court disagreed, stating: The language of section 101(a) makes it clear that the purpose of the statute is to authorize the President to dictate that preference be given the government contracts which are necessary to promote the national defense . . . Significantly, section 101(a) does not mention either the specific nature of performance under a DPA contract, or the subsequent use of goods produced under such a contract. Therefore, we conclude that, while the risk imposed by section 101(a) does include the possible need of a contractor to break its contracts with third parties in order to give preference to a DPA contract, it does not include the risk that the product produced under the DPA contract will be inherently unsafe to users. 211 Consistent with the court’s reasoning in In re Agent Orange, immunity under the DPA would not apply to defendants who improperly dispose of waste or discharge hazardous substances despite the existence of a contract with the government. Unless a contract with the government explicitly directs and authorizes the waste disposal and discharge methods to be undertaken by a defendant, it is difficult to see how the DPA can successfully be asserted as a 208 Id. at 845. 209 24 F.3d 188 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 210 Id. at 202. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a)(1964) authorizes the President “to compel contract performance as well as contract acceptance.” Id. at 202-203. 211 Id. at 203. © 51 Law Seminars International | Natural Resource Damages | 07/16/10 in Santa Fe, NM
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Allan Kanner of Kanner & Whiteley, L.L.C. Speaker 23: 53<br />
interpretation or one not applying section 707 to tort suits altogether is adopted, the<br />
Defense Production Act would not bar plaintiffs’ claims. 208<br />
Similarly, in Hercules, Inc. v. United States, the federal circuit examined the scope of<br />
immunity of section 707 of the DPA.<br />
In Hercules, manufacturers sued the United States<br />
government in order to recover expenses incurred as a result of Agent Orange litigation. 209<br />
The<br />
defendants argued that because the government had compelled them to enter into contracts for<br />
the production of “Agent Orange” pursuant to section 101 of the DPA, the defendants were<br />
entitled to immunity under section 707 for both contract and tort suits. 210<br />
The court disagreed,<br />
stating:<br />
The language of section 101(a) makes it clear that the purpose of the statute is to<br />
authorize the President to dictate that preference be given the government<br />
contracts which are necessary to promote the national defense . . . Significantly,<br />
section 101(a) does not mention either the specific nature of performance under a<br />
DPA contract, or the subsequent use of goods produced under such a contract.<br />
Therefore, we conclude that, while the risk imposed by section 101(a) does<br />
include the possible need of a contractor to break its contracts with third parties in<br />
order to give preference to a DPA contract, it does not include the risk that the<br />
product produced under the DPA contract will be inherently unsafe to users. 211<br />
Consistent with the court’s reasoning in In re Agent Orange, immunity under the DPA<br />
would not apply to defendants who improperly dispose of waste or discharge hazardous<br />
substances despite the existence of a contract with the government. Unless a contract with the<br />
government explicitly directs and authorizes the waste disposal and discharge methods to be<br />
undertaken by a defendant, it is difficult to see how the DPA can successfully be asserted as a<br />
208 Id. at 845.<br />
209 24 F.3d 188 (<strong>Fe</strong>d. Cir. 1994).<br />
210 Id. at 202. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a)(1964) authorizes the President “to compel contract performance as well as<br />
contract acceptance.” Id. at 202-203.<br />
211 Id. at 203.<br />
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Law Seminars International | Natural Resource Damages | 07/16/10 in <strong>Santa</strong> <strong>Fe</strong>, NM