LSI 2010 NRD Santa Fe final conference binder 072110.pdf
LSI 2010 NRD Santa Fe final conference binder 072110.pdf LSI 2010 NRD Santa Fe final conference binder 072110.pdf
Allan Kanner of Kanner & Whiteley, L.L.C. Speaker 23: 10 navigable waters in trust for the use and benefit of the public. 26 The public trust doctrine was first applied in case law pertaining to disputes over navigable waters. These cases began with the premise that navigable beds, critical to commerce, were owned by the state and held in common by the state for public use. In the early American case of Home v. Richards, 27 the court held that the bed of a navigable river within the Commonwealth could not be granted to an individual. 28 The general scope of the doctrine is well articulated in the seminal United States Supreme Court case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois: That the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that the state holds title to soils under tide water, by common law, we have already shown; . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters . . . and have liberty of fishing therein . . . The trust devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost . . . 29 Although the public trust began with a more limited focus during an era of relatively weak environmental understanding, the trend over time has been to expand protection to an equally broad array of natural resources. Since the doctrine’s first application to navigable beds, 26 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVIDSON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 1, § 2:3 (1972). 27 8 Va. (4 Call) 441 (Va. 1798). 28 Over the years, because the doctrine was used in relation to waterways, some confusion arose about the public trust and its relation to riparians. See, e.g., Groner v. Foster, 27 S.E. 493 (Va. 1897) (emphasizing rights of riparians in navigable waters); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 47 S.E. 875 (Va. 1904)(reconciling rights of the riparian with public rights); Commonwealth v. Garner, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 655 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1846) (noting that navigable streams were the property of the Commonwealth, held for the public benefit). Nonetheless, the principle that government has a proprietary interest in natural resources survived. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 29 146 U.S. 387, 452-453 (1892)(emphasis added). © 8 Law Seminars International | Natural Resource Damages | 07/16/10 in Santa Fe, NM
Allan Kanner of Kanner & Whiteley, L.L.C. Speaker 23: 11 whose import to commerce is obvious, it has been extended to include state trusteeship over natural resources 30 with little or no commercial value, such as non-navigable waters, 31 and state parks. 32 Additionally, although the public trust doctrine speaks in terms of duties and not NRD, the nexus between resources that are recognized as being held in trust by the state is their importance to the general public, aesthetically as well as commercially. This importance supersedes the natural resources’ potential value from exploitation by any one individual. More recent cases have recognized that the trust is active, not passive, and imposes a responsibility on states to preserve and promote the trust corpus. 33 Thus, a pattern has emerged in which states are directed to take a more proactive approach in order to fulfill their obligations and responsibilities with regard to the protection of natural resources. Recognizing that the state has an important interest in conserving and protecting natural resources, the doctrine of parens patriae allows the state (in its capacity as “trustee”) to bring suit to protect those natural resources. This type of suit, recognized in many states, 34 allows the trustee (state) to sue to make the trust (natural resources) whole, whether by means of restoration 30 The legal fiction of state ownership of natural resources was abandoned in Hughes as being inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, however, the Supreme Court in that case recognized the important interest at stake. The Supreme Court stated, “We consider the States’ interests in conservation and protection of wild animals as legitimate local purposes similar to the States’ interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens.” Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. 31 See National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Ca. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 32 See Sax, supra n. 26, at 485; Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234 (8th Cir. 1899); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966). 33 See, e.g., National Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 724-725; City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927). 34 See, e.g., Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Me. 1973); Department of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D. Md. 1972); Department of Fish & Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 925 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Department of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976); State v. Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974); State Department of Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 766-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). © 9 Law Seminars International | Natural Resource Damages | 07/16/10 in Santa Fe, NM
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Allan Kanner of Kanner & Whiteley, L.L.C. Speaker 23: 10<br />
navigable waters in trust for the use and benefit of the public. 26<br />
The public trust doctrine was<br />
first applied in case law pertaining to disputes over navigable waters. These cases began with<br />
the premise that navigable beds, critical to commerce, were owned by the state and held in<br />
common by the state for public use. In the early American case of Home v. Richards, 27 the court<br />
held that the bed of a navigable river within the Commonwealth could not be granted to an<br />
individual. 28<br />
The general scope of the doctrine is well articulated in the seminal United States<br />
Supreme Court case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois:<br />
That the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake<br />
Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that the state holds title to soils<br />
under tide water, by common law, we have already shown; . . . It is a title held in<br />
trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the<br />
waters . . . and have liberty of fishing therein . . . The trust devolving upon the<br />
state for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and<br />
control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a<br />
transfer of the property. The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can<br />
never be lost . . . 29<br />
Although the public trust began with a more limited focus during an era of relatively<br />
weak environmental understanding, the trend over time has been to expand protection to an<br />
equally broad array of natural resources. Since the doctrine’s first application to navigable beds,<br />
26 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.<br />
REV. 471 (1970); V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVIDSON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 1, § 2:3<br />
(1972).<br />
27 8 Va. (4 Call) 441 (Va. 1798).<br />
28 Over the years, because the doctrine was used in relation to waterways, some confusion arose about the public<br />
trust and its relation to riparians. See, e.g., Groner v. Foster, 27 S.E. 493 (Va. 1897) (emphasizing rights of<br />
riparians in navigable waters); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 47 S.E. 875 (Va. 1904)(reconciling rights of the riparian<br />
with public rights); Commonwealth v. Garner, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 655 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1846) (noting that navigable<br />
streams were the property of the Commonwealth, held for the public benefit). Nonetheless, the principle that<br />
government has a proprietary interest in natural resources survived. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408<br />
(1948); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441<br />
U.S. 322 (1979).<br />
29 146 U.S. 387, 452-453 (1892)(emphasis added).<br />
© 8<br />
Law Seminars International | Natural Resource Damages | 07/16/10 in <strong>Santa</strong> <strong>Fe</strong>, NM