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LSI 2010 Real Estate Joint Ventures conference materials.pdf

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David E. Myre, Jr. of Hillis Clark Martin & Peterson, P.S.<br />

Jane Rakay Nelson of Lane Powell PC<br />

Speaker 9b: 6<br />

Speaker 10b: 6<br />

Investor: I seem to have touched a nerve. Well, as to the enforceability, these<br />

terms are quite typical and are specifically authorized by Delaware law. It’s a<br />

little unusual, but you may have noticed that I attached a copy of the pertinent<br />

section of the Delaware statute---section 18-502(c)---to the Term Sheet as an<br />

exhibit. Take a look.<br />

Tell you what. Let’s postpone further discussion of this last topic until we<br />

come back to the “removal” and “Default” provisions later in the Term Sheet.<br />

Investor is concerned about the scenarios of the Project running into serious<br />

trouble, Developer deciding to “give up” on the Project, and intentionally<br />

refusing to honor a series of additional capital calls. And Investor not being<br />

able to dislodge Developer and take control of the mess. But let’s try to address<br />

that concern when we get to the subject of Manager removal and Member<br />

default.<br />

Developer: Okay. One last question. I gather from the Term Sheet that Investor<br />

proposes a different, much simpler approach to the subject of additional capital<br />

contributions after the JV achieves Project Stabilization. Why is that?<br />

Investor: Three reasons. First, once it hits Project Stabilization, the JV has passed<br />

through a phase of relatively high risk and into a period of much lower risk.<br />

Almost all of the development, construction and lease-up risks will be behind<br />

us. The most likely scenario leading to an equity capital shortfall after Project<br />

Stabilization would probably be an uninsured casualty, or a design or<br />

construction defect not covered by the warranties, or a major lease rollover<br />

requiring substantial, unanticipated tenant improvements. So, generally<br />

speaking, Investor feels there will be much less likelihood of needing to make<br />

unforeseen additional capital contributions after Project Stabilization.<br />

Second, soon after Project Stabilization the JV will refinance the Construction<br />

Loan with the Term Loan described in the Term Sheet. Investor anticipates<br />

that, unlike the Construction Loan, the Term Loan will permit subordinate<br />

financing for the Project, at least if it is an unsecured loan to the Company. So<br />

we will be able to use a simpler structure to deal with the scenario if a Member<br />

decides not to make an additional capital contribution – namely, a direct loan by<br />

the other Member to the JV.<br />

Third, as mentioned in the Term Sheet, the JV agreement will provide that, after<br />

Project Stabilization, the Members will go through an annual process of<br />

mutually approving an annual budget and annual business plan for the<br />

DWT 12265643v1 0000099-071219<br />

6<br />

Law Seminars International | <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> <strong>Joint</strong> <strong>Ventures</strong> and Funds | 02/08/10 in Seattle, WA

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