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LSI 2010 Real Estate Joint Ventures conference materials.pdf

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John W. Hanley, Jr. of Davis Wright Tremaine LLP Speaker 20a: 11<br />

should be borne by the fund, not by the manager. In the fund sponsor’s view, the appropriate<br />

mechanism to effect this allocation of responsibility is indemnification of the manager (and,<br />

typically, his affiliates, directors, officers, personnel, employees and agents) by the fund itself.<br />

The scope of this indemnification frequently shields against claims and liabilities arising out of,<br />

or related to, almost any conduct under the fund charter or in pursuit of fund objectives.<br />

Frequently the only stated exceptions to this general indemnity umbrella relate to circumstances<br />

where there has been a demonstrated (and usually egregious) failure by the management team to<br />

conform to the stated or expected standard of conduct – most notably, self-dealing by the fund<br />

manager. There has also typically been an exception from indemnification for “gross<br />

negligence” by the manager. Some investors have pushed to expand that exception to include<br />

conduct which amounts to “mere” negligence by the manager, but fund sponsors have resisted<br />

and, at least before the market crashed, this was not a market standard term.<br />

A related issue concerns the strength of the indemnity commitment made by the fund to<br />

the manager. During its life, the fund will (presumably) have the financial strength (i.e., its<br />

portfolio of assets) to make the indemnity meaningful. However, the fund sponsor may also be<br />

concerned about the possibility of a claim against him after the fund has been liquidated. It is<br />

relatively unusual, but a fund charter may contain a clawback provision pursuant to which, for a<br />

limited period of months or years following fund termination, the investors will be obligated to<br />

return to the fund such monies, from their respective distributions, as are needed to meet the<br />

fund’s continuing tail obligation to indemnify the manager for fund-related claims and liabilities.<br />

Removal of Manager. Investors usually expect to have the right to remove the fund<br />

manager from his position of control in a variety of circumstances that threaten the fund’s<br />

survival or profitability. Frequently, this removal power will be exercisable only upon the<br />

occurrence of a “for cause” circumstance, which may be described in the limited liability<br />

company agreement as conviction of a crime, willful malfeasance or other forms of egregious<br />

conduct. The investors may press for the right to remove the manager without having to prove<br />

“cause,” but fund sponsors typically resist. Such a right is usually provided, at all, only if upon<br />

the occurrence of a specific sign of significant financial distress and only if exercised by a super<br />

majority of members.<br />

The fund charter should specify the mechanics for exercise of the members’ removal<br />

power, if any; in particular, whether a formal vote of (or consent by) the non-managing members<br />

will be required (if so, and at what level). The fund’s operating agreement should also address<br />

the consequences of removal, which may vary depending upon the grounds for removal. In the<br />

instance of removal for cause, the fund manager might forfeit his promoted interest and also<br />

suffer some form of dilution or loss with respect his own invested capital in the enterprise. In<br />

other forms of removal, there might be a less draconian consequence, such as a forfeiture of<br />

projected economic return but payment of some compensatory or reimbursement amount to<br />

mitigate the loss. Finally, the investors should consider the impact of removal of the fund<br />

manager on (i) any rights the manager or an affiliate may hold as a member by virtue of having<br />

made its own capital investment in the fund, (ii) ongoing contract relationships with the fund<br />

held by affiliates of the manager, such as a property management contract, and (iii) the impact of<br />

the change in fund management on the fund’s important third party contracts – especially the<br />

mortgage financing for its portfolio assets.<br />

DWT 13620946v1 0000099-071219<br />

Law Seminars International | <strong>Real</strong> <strong>Estate</strong> <strong>Joint</strong> <strong>Ventures</strong> and Funds | 02/09/10 in Seattle, WA<br />

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