The Heaven and Earth Society and the Red Turban Rebellion in ...

Tiandihui and had joined the forces of Chen Kai, who occupied the town the year before. 126 Statements
made in the same case provided evidences of the soldiers’ drug-addiction, gambling, prostitution, illicit dues,
and affiliations with the Tiandihui. 127 Even greedy soldiers relished the opportunity to collect the loot of the
rebels for themselves. For example, during the battle against Chen Ji 陳 吉 of Shunde, they immediately fell
on the booty left by the rebels who were routed, despite the order to pursue the rebels and wipe them out. 128
Banner troops stationed at the provincial city had similar problems. The standard of living of the
average Banner soldier had declined considerably by the mid-nineteenth century. Groups of idle young
Bannermen wander about the city of Guangzhou, provoking trouble wherever they could, became a serious
problem. As a result, it was suggested to the Governor-General that he should take advantage of the urgent
demand for soldiers during the siege of Guangzhou in 1854 to recruit the jobless Bannermen into a
mercenary force attached to their own Banner to strengthen the defense of the city. 129
In late 1854, Red Turban rebels appeared everywhere in the Pearl River Delta, where 15,000
government troops had long been concentrated; the soldiers fought poorly, however, for they had not
received any pay for a long time. The total number of soldiers then available in Guangdong province was
less than 5,000, and, since the generals cared only for the protection of their own provinces, the isolated
units were frequently surrounded and harassed by their foe. 130 For instance, Ye Mingchen in 1855 made a
sharp complaint to the throne against the Qing forces from other provinces. He said that he could not
command any troops in the neighboring provinces, and the soldiers were either still at their original stations
or had purposely slowed down in their movements so that others might go first and bear the brunt of fighting.
Thus no other governor paid much attention to the strong forces of the Red Turban in Guangdong. 131 In
other words, the incompetence and low morale of the Qing officers and men was one major reason for the
prolonged war against the Rebel forces.
But most importantly, the poor relationship between soldiers and civilians was the principal cause
for the long delay of military success. For many years the government could not count on civilian support for
the imperial soldiers, who did innumerable horrible things to the people. In Guangdong, the situation was
certainly bad. The conduct of officials serving in the province was regarded as the basic cause of disorder in
the early years of the Red Turban Rebellion:
Where does the source of the present day turbulence lie? It lies in those magistrates that are
greedy and cruel. Let us speak of western Guangdong. When disorder had not yet arisen in
western Guangdong, officials who held posts in this region…perceiving that the custom there is
primitive and the people are ignorant, treated the latter as if they were birds, beasts, or savages
that deserve no affection or care. 132
The writer goes on to say that superior officials are themselves corrupt, and aid their subordinates, whom
they treat as their agents. As a result:
126 F.O. 931.1522. Report on three rebels. (1855); F.O. 931.1493 and F.O. 931.1133. Reports on three
executed rebels at Foshan (June 1855).
127 Ibid. Soldiers and militiamen of the Opium War were discharged when the foreign menace was
apparently disposed of after 1849 and many of them became bandits or joined secret societies as soon as
they were discharged. According to Wang Tianjiang, there were approximately sixty to seventy percent of
the Green Standard and Hunan Armies in the secret societies during the 1860s. See Wang Tianjiang 王 天 奖 ,
“19shiji xiaban de zhong’guo di mimi shehui19 世 纪 下 半 的 中 国 地 秘 密 社 会 ,” Lishi yanjiu 历 史 研 究 No.
2 (Beijing, 1963), 85-6.
128 F.O. 137.6.6. Note on rebellious societies along the coast of Guangdong (c. 1855)
129 F.O. 253A.3.22. Five proposals for the defense of Guangzhou (1854).
130 Guangzhou supposed to have 5,000 Banner troops, 4,000 Green Standard troops, 2,000 mercenaries
from Chaozhou and 4,000 mercenaries from Dong’guan. However, more than two thirds of the troops were
temporarily disabled because of on-going troubles in rural areas and in neighboring province. For instance,
upwards of 3,000 soldiers were sent to fight the Taipings in Hunan and many were also transferred to north
Guangdong to fight against the rebels. See F.O. 17.217. Desp. 59, Incl., Morrison’s report (Nov. 9, 1854);
F.O. 931. 1098 A list of officers and numbers of troops (1850s).
131 F.O. 931.1609 Ye to Commander-in-chief of Guangxi (1855); Jian, Quanshi, 852.
132 Guangzhou Fuzhi, 129.24b, quoted by Hsiao, Rural China, pp. 469-70.
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