*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 52
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978)
122 S.J. 162
(Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302)
purposes the governing bodies for cricket may well
be regarded by those concerned with the ICC as the
“members,” particularly since rule 3
gives those bodies the power to nominate
representatives to the ICC. Nevertheless, the wording
of the body of the rules seems to me to be quite
clear. Under the rules it is the country and not its
governing body for cricket, which is the member.
The wording of rules 2 (a), (b), 3 (b) and 7
, for example, draws a clear distinction
between a country and such governing body. In
these circumstances I do not think that the court, in
construing the rules, would be justified in doing violence
to the clear language which the ICC has
chosen to adopt, particularly if the purpose and result
of so doing is merely to enable the ICC to take
advantage of the very far-reaching immunity given
to “employers' association” by the Act of 1974. If
the ICC wishes to seek to take advantage of such
immunity, it must first, at least, amend its rules so
as to make it plain that its members are in truth the
relevant “employer” bodies; and I do not say that,
even then, there will not be many further obstacles
in its path.
However, even if, contrary to my view, by some
very strained construction of the ICC rules, it were
possible to treat the five governing bodies for cricket
mentioned in the further and better particulars of
the ICC's amended defences as being members of
the ICC, the ICC still has to show that it is an organisation
consisting “wholly or mainly” of employers.
The ICC, however, consists not of five but
of 22 members, all of whom have voting rights,
though in the case of “associate members,” such
voting rights are not exercisable in relation to one
or two specified matters, such as the “up-grading”
of an associate member or the amendment of the
rules. Of the remaining 17 members, it is not alleged
that the Cricket Council, which is the governing
body for cricket in the United Kingdom,
*360 is an “employer”; and there
is no evidence whatever as to the organisation or
structure of cricket in the 16 countries which are
expressed to be “associate members.” For all that
the evidence shows, none of the respective governing
bodies for cricket in these countries may be
“employers.”
For these reasons, in answer to question
(F) above, the ICC in my judgment fails to surmount
the first of the two hurdles which it must
surmount if it is to show that it is an “employers'
association” within
section 28 (2) (a)
of the Act of 1974. For it has not shown
that it is an organisation which consists “wholly or
mainly of employers.” In these circumstances it is
unnecessary to consider whether it could show that
it is “an organisation whose principal purposes include
the regulation of relations between employers
… and workers.”
XVII Is the TCCB an “employers'
association"? Question (G) above
The TCCB, like the ICC, now claims that
it is an “employers' association” within the definition
contained in
section 28 (2) (a)
of the Act of 1974. It does not rely on
section 28 (2) (b) . Like the ICC,
therefore, it has to show, first, that it is an organisation
which “consists wholly or mainly of employers
of one or more descriptions” and, secondly, that it
is “an organisation whose principal purposes include
the regulation of relations between employers
of that description or those descriptions and workers.”
Rule 1 of the Rules of the TCCB
as follows: “1.
Constitution
provides
“Chairman — To be appointed annually by the
board. Members — M.C.C. Each of the 17 first
class counties. The Minor Counties Cricket Association.
Secretary — To be appointed by the board.”
In the context of these rules, the expression
“the 17 first class counties” in my judgment
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