*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 50
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978)
122 S.J. 162
(Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302)
selves consist wholly or mainly of constituent or affiliated
organisations which fulfil those conditions),
or
(ii)representatives of such constituent
or affiliated organisations; and in either case is
an organisation whose principal purposes include
the regulation of relations between employers and
workers … or include the regulation of relations
between its constitutent or affiliated organisations.”
Section 30 (1) of the Act contains a definition
of “worker” which omitting words that are immaterial
for present purposes, reads as follows:
“‘Worker’ (subject to the following provisions of
this section) means an individual regarded in
whichever (if any) of the following capacities is applicable
to him, that is to say, as a person who
works or normally works or seeks to work
—(a)under a contract of employment; or(b)under
any other contract (whether express or implied, and,
if express, whether oral or in writing) whereby he
undertakes to do or perform personally any work or
services for another party to the contract who is not
a professional client of his; …”
Section 30 (6)
provides:
“For the purposes of this Act it is immaterial
whether the law which (apart from this Act) governs
any persons' employment is the law of the
United Kingdom, or of a part of the United Kingdom,
or not.”
The ICC claims that it is an “employers'
association” within limb ( a ) of
the statutory definition contained in
section 28 (2) . It does not rely on
limb ( b ). It follows that if the
ICC is to prove that it is an “employers' association”
within the statutory definition, it must surmount
two hurdles. First, it must show that it is an
organisation which “consists wholly or mainly of
employers … of one or more descriptions.”
Secondly, it must show that it is an “organisation
whose principal purposes include the regulation of
relations between employers of that description or
those descriptions and workers.”
In relation to this first hurdle, the ICC was
requested to give further and better particulars of its
allegation that it is an “employers' association,” by
stating whether it was alleged that its membership
consists wholly or mainly of employers and if so
identifying such members and giving full particulars
of the employees of each such member. Its answer
to this request took the following form:
“It is so alleged, the employers who
are members being: The Australian Cricket Board,
The New Zealand Cricket Council, The Board of
Control for Cricket for Pakistan, Indian Cricket
Board, West Indies Cricket Board of Control. Their
employees are those *358
who, having satisfied the conditions
for eligibility aforesaid, are selected to play in Test
or touring matches.”
There are, in my judgment, at least two
reasons why this plea cannot on any footing succeed.
First, under the rules of the ICC, the five bodies
to which I have just referred are not themselves
even members of the ICC. I need only refer to a
few of these rules to demonstrate that throughout
the rules, the member countries themselves, rather
than their governing bodies for cricket, are treated
as being the members. Thus, for example,
rule 1 reads: “1.
Constitution
“Chairman — The president of M.C.C. for the time
being or his nominee. Foundation Members —
United Kingdom and Australia. Full Members —
India, New Zealand, West Indies and Pakistan. Associate
Members — Argentina, Bermuda, Canada,
Denmark, East Africa, Fiji, Gibraltar, Holland,
Hongkong, Israel, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, United States of America and
West Africa. Secretary — The secretary of M.C.C.”
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