*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 35
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978)
122 S.J. 162
(Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302)
ising rights attached thereto which were still vested
in it) would still have constituted *340
assets in its hands which were valuable assets,
in the sense that it could reasonably have expected
to be able to sell, lease or licence them to
one or more companies, inside or outside its own
group, which would be in a better financial position
to exploit them. The contracts in question were
fully assignable. If the defendants had succeeded in
persuading merely one or two of the players to
withdraw from their contracts, this could have cast
doubts on the viability of the whole World Series
Cricket project, with consequent risks of incalculable
loss to the company which had entered into
substantial commitments both with the players involved
and to other persons in connection with the
project.
In the circumstances World Series Cricket has, in
my judgment, established the likelihood of more
than nominal damage resulting to it, if the ICC's
acts of interference with its contracts with players
are successful.(6)
Justification
I have already made it plain that good faith and absence
of malice on the part of a defendant do not as
such provide any defence to an action based on inducement
of breach of contract. The authorities,
however, show that, even if all the other ingredients
of the tort are present in a given case, the defendant
may still escape liability, if he can in the particular
circumstances show sufficient “justification” in law
for what he did.
Romer L.J. in Glamorgan Coal
Co. Ltd. v. South Wales Miners' Federation [1903]
2 K.B. 545 , 573, pointed out that it would
be extremely difficult, even if it were possible, to
give a complete and satisfactory definition of
“sufficient justification” and that most attempts to
do so would probably be mischievous. He agreed
with what Bowen L.J. had said in Mogul
Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.
(1889) 23 Q.B.D. 598 , 618, namely, that
when difficulty might arise in deciding whether
there was sufficient justification or not, “the good
sense of the tribunal which had to decide would
have to analyse the circumstances and to discover
on which side of the line each case fell” Romer L.J.
continued, at p. 574:
“I will only add that, in analysing or
considering the circumstances, I think that regard
might be had to the nature of the contract broken;
the position of the parties to the contract; the
grounds for the breach; the means employed to procure
the breach; the relation of the person procuring
the breach to the person who breaks the contract;
and I think also to the object of the person in procuring
the breach. But, though I deprecate the attempt
to define justification, I think it right to express
my opinion on certain points in connection
with breaches of contract procured where the contract
is one of master and servant. In my opinion, a
defendant sued for knowingly procuring such a
breach is not justified of necessity merely by his
showing that he had no personal animus against the
employer, or that it was to the advantage or interest
of both the defendant and the workman that the
contract should be broken. I take the following
simple case to illustrate my view. If A wants to get
a specially good workman, who is under contract
with B, as A knows, and A gets the workman to
break his contract to B's injury by giving him higher
wages, it would not, in my opinion, afford A a
defence to an action against him by B that he could
establish he had no personal *341
animus against B, and that it was both
in the interest of himself and of the workman that
the contract with B should be broken. I think that
the principle involved in this simple case, taken by
me by way of illustration, really governs the
present case. For it is to be remembered that what A
has to justify is his action, not as between him and
the workman, but as regards the employer B.”
Romer L.J., on the facts of that particular case went
on to hold, at p. 576, that there was no sufficient
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