*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 30
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978)
122 S.J. 162
(Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302)
and its players? In my judgment, beyond doubt
there has. The very terms of the ICC resolutions of
July 26, 1977, by imposing a Test Match ban on
any players who should play or make themselves
available to play in World Series Cricket matches
after October 1, 1977, were calculated to cause and
doubtless did cause those players who had already
contracted with World Series Cricket, but were otherwise
eligible to play in Test cricket and wished to
remain eligible for Test selection, to consider
whether they should take advantage of the period of
grace granted them and attempt to withdraw from
their contracts with World Series Cricket before
October 1. The resolutions, by necessary implication,
contained a threat of a ban directed at the
players who had so contracted, coupled with a suggestion
that they could escape from its operation by
terminating their contractual relations with World
Series Cricket before the stated date. Thus in my
judgment the resolutions constituted an inducement
to those players to terminate such relationships as
much as if they had contained express words urging
them to take this course.
A number of the plaintiffs' witnesses, such
as Mr. Greig and Mr. Underwood, accepted in evidence
that they realised the possible risk of a ban of
this nature being imposed, when they signed their
contracts with World Series Cricket. It was submitted
on behalf of the defendants by Mr. Kempster, in
his opening speech, that the reason why there have,
so far, been no defections from World Series Cricket
consequent on the ICC and TCCB bans is that
they were fully anticipated and discounted by all
the players when they entered into their contracts
with it. In such circumstances, it was submitted that
the ICC and TCCB resolutions or proposed resolutions
presented no real threat of interference with
the relevant contracts. I find this line of argument
on behalf of the defendants unconvincing. First, in
the case of many of the 50 or so players involved,
there is no evidence whatever that they actually anticipated
the imposition of the bans in question.
Secondly, it is no answer to a person who has deliberately
attempted to interfere with the contractual
relations of another to plead that his attempts were
in all the circumstances of the case likely to be unsuccessful.
In a quia timet action it suffices for the
plaintiff to show that the attempt,
if
successful, is likely to cause him more
than nominal damage.
The ICC when it published its press statement
of July 26, in my judgment, was applying
pressure or persuasion to the minds of all cricketers
like Mr. Greig, Mr. Knott and Mr. Underwood, who
had contracted with World Series Cricket but
wished to remain eligible to play official Test cricket
for their country, as directly as if it had written to
each of such *335 players and
told them that if they played or made themselves
available to play for World Series Cricket after October
1, they would be disqualified from official
Test cricket. The implicit threat contained in the
terms of the press statement was directly aimed at
the minds of such persons, who, the ICC could
reasonably have assumed, would very soon read or
hear of it. In these circumstances “direct interference”
on the part of the ICC, in the relevant sense
has been proved. (3)
Knowledge
The degree of knowledge on the part of a
defendant which is required as an essential ingredient
of the tort of inducement of breach of contract
in my judgment adequately appears from the judgments
of Lord Denning M.R. and Diplock L.J. in
Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lowthian
[1966] 1 W.L.R. 691 . In that case, the
defendants, who were officers of a building workers'
trade union, having learned of a contract made
between the main contractors of a new power station
and the plaintiff sub-contractors, though not of
the precise terms of the contract, informed the main
contractors that, unless all bricklayers on the
project were directly employed by them and the
sub-contract terminated by specific dates, the union
members would be advised not to work. The
plaintiff sub-contractors obtained from the Court of
Appeal an interlocutory injunction to restrain the
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