*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 3
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978)
122 S.J. 162
(Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302)
during each season; that, accordingly, there could
be no implied term that the promoter would arrange
a tour outside Australia but to give the contract
business efficacy such a term would be implied for
a tour in Australia and, therefore, it could not be
said that the contracts were void as being in restraint
of trade and contrary to public policy and, as
there were no grounds for an allegation that the
contracts were voidable, the contracts were to be
treated as valid and enforceable (post, pp.
326E–327A).
Aspdin v. Austin (1844) 5 Q.B. 671 and
Devonald v. Rosser & Sons [1906] 2 K.B.
728, C.A. applied .
(2) That by altering (and, in the case of the
TCCB, showing its firm intention to alter) the rules
so that the plaintiff cricketers were banned from
playing in future Test Matches and county cricket
and by deferring the effect of that alteration until
October 1, 1977, the ICC and the TCCB had directly
interfered with the promoter's contracts with
the cricketers and they had done so at a time when
they had knowledge of the relevant contracts and
with intent to apply pressure on the plaintiff cricketers
to withdraw from their contracts (whether or
not they might have lawful rights to withdraw) in
circumstances in which there was a likelihood that
the promoter might suffer damage; that in those circumstances
the defendants had committed the tortious
act of inducing a breach of contract and, although
they had acted in good faith and without
malice, they were liable unless they could justify
their actions as against the promoter; that, since the
defendants had failed to prove that the relevant contracts
were void or voidable and there were no other
factors that could be material to the defence of justification,
they were liable unless they were immune
from legal proceedings under section
14 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act
1974 (post, pp. 334B–E, 336E–F, 338B–E,
340C–D, 341B–E, 342D–E, G–H, 343B–D, E–F,
344C–F, H–345A).
Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, H.L.(E.)
; Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v.
Lowthian [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691, C.A. and
Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins [1969] 2
Ch. 106, C.A. applied .
(3) That the ICC had a legitimate interest to
ensure that international cricket was properly organised
and administered albeit most cricketers
were not professional players in the sense that they
earned their living by playing cricket; that the
TCCB also had a legitimate interest in ensuring that
cricket was properly administered and organised;
but that the defendants had to show that they had
acted reasonably in imposing the bans which were
prima facie in restraint of trade; that neither the
ICC nor the TCCB had shown that the bans were
reasonable in the circumstances and, therefore, unless
they were employers' associations protected
from legal suit by section 14 of the
Act, *305 the plaintiff cricketers were
entitled to declarations that the alteration of the
rules were ultra vires and void (post, pp. 346C,
347G–H, 354H–355A).
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition
Co. Ltd. [1894] A.C. 535, H.L.(E.)
and Eastham v. Newcastle United
Football Club Ltd. [1964] Ch. 413 applied .
(4) That, since under the rules of the ICC the
member countries themselves, rather than their governing
bodies for cricket, were treated as being the
members and the rules drew a clear distinction
between a country and such governing body, the
ICC had failed to show that it was an organisation
consisting “wholly or mainly” of employers, and
therefore it could not be an employers' association
within the meaning of section 28 (2) (a) of
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974
; that, although the TCCB was an organisation
consisting wholly or mainly of employers of
one or more descriptions, it also was not an employers'
association within the definition in
section 28 (2) (a) because it was not
constituted for the purpose of regulating relations
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