*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 29
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978)
122 S.J. 162
(Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302)
right to rescind a contract to exercise such right.
Mr. Morritt, on behalf of World Series Cricket, submitted
to the contrary and referred me in this context
to the decision in
Keane v. Boycott
(1795) 2 H. B1. 511 . In that case, the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for
enticing away from his service his servant who was
an infant. Eyre C.J. held that the contract between
the servant and his master was voidable, not void,
and that the voidability of this contract provided no
defence to the action. As he said, at p. 515:
“For this is the case of a stranger and a wrong-doer
interfering between the master and servant, and
now seeking to take advantage of the infant's privilege
of avoiding his contracts, a privilege which is
personal to the infant, and which no one can exercise
for him.”
In reliance on this decision, Mr. Morritt submitted
that, if the other elements of the tort are present, it
matters not that the contract interfered with was
voidable. More recent judicial dicta, however, suggest
that the tort is not committed, if the interference
in question results not in any breach of the relevant
contract, but merely in a party exercising a
lawful right to terminate it.
Thus in D. C. Thomson & Co.
Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646 , 702, Morris
L.J. said:
“If A has a contract with B, the tort will be committed
by X if there is a violation of the right B has under
his contract by the intentional interference of X.
If the contract between A and B is lawfully terminated,
there is no violation.”
A passage from the judgment of Diplock
L.J. in Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v.
Lowthian [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691 , 703–704,
can be read in much the same way.
In the two last mentioned cases the court was not,
in terms, considering the situation where a contract
could be lawfully terminated not so much because
of rights given by the contract as because one of the
parties had a right to rescind it on the grounds of
misrepresentation or undue influence. Nevertheless
the dicta cited appear to be of general application.
For the purpose of this judgment, therefore, so far
as it is relevant at all, I propose to assume in favour
of the defendants, without deciding, that it does not
constitute a tort for a third party to induce a person
to exercise a lawful right to rescind a contract.
In the light of this introduction, I now turn to consider
whether the five essential ingredients of the
tort of interference with contractual relations are
present in relation to the ICC.(2)
“Direct interference
First, has there been interference by the
ICC with the players' contracts with World Series
Cricket and, if so, has that interference been of a
“direct” nature? Though there have been many decisions
indicating whether particular stated sets of
facts constitute “direct,” as opposed to “indirect,”
interference, I have been referred to no statement of
principle *334 which specifically
defines the difference between the two types of interference.
I take it, however, that the phrase “direct
interference” covers the case where the intervener,
either by himself or his agents, speaks, writes or
publishes words or does other acts which communicate
pressure or persuasion to the mind or person
of one of the contracting parties themselves, while
“indirect interference” refers to the case where,
without actually doing any of these things, the intervener
nevertheless procures or attempts to procure
a situation which will result or may result in a
breach of the contract see, for example, J.
T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley [1965] A.C. 269
, 333, per Lord Pearce:
D. C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin
[1952] Ch. 646 , 678, per
Evershed M.R.
Has there been direct interference in this sense by
the ICC with the contracts of World Series Cricket
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