*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 12
[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978)
122 S.J. 162
(Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302)
claims based on alleged inducement of breach of
contract. In the latter context it is relevant, inasmuch
as these particular claims have from the beginning
been quia timet claims, that is to say claims
based merely on apprehended injury; it is not
claimed that any attempted inducement by the defendants
has as yet actually resulted in any of the
players involved withdrawing from their contracts.
In the context of inducement of breach of contract,
a further point will arise for decision. The defendants,
having since the issue of proceedings for the
first time seen copies of typical contracts entered
into between World Series Cricket and the players
involved, now assert that they are on the face of
them not merely voidable but void for reasons
which I will explain later. The relevance of this assertion
is that it does not constitute a tort to induce
the breach or termination of a void contract.*314
III The nine principal questions to be decided
• (A) Are the contracts between World Series Cricket and its players void?
In all the circumstances, Mr. Kempster on
behalf of the defendants suggested that there were
14 questions which the court will have to decide in
these two actions. Mr. Morritt on behalf of the
plaintiffs suggested that there were 20. Though
many other subsidiary points will fall to be dealt
with, including all those referred to by counsel, I
regard the following as being the nine principal
questions that will arise for ultimate decision of the
court in these two actions:
• (B) Has World Series Cricket established that as at August 3, 1977, and subject to any statutory
immunity conferred by the Act of 1974, it had a good cause of action in tort against the ICC, based on inducement
of breach of contract?
• (C) Has World Series Cricket established that as at August 3, 1977, and subject as aforesaid, it had
a good cause of action in tort against the TCCB based on the same grounds?
• (D) Subject to the provisions of the Act of 1974, are the new rules of the ICC void as being in restraint
of trade?
• (E) Subject as aforesaid, are the proposed new rules of the TCCB void as being in restraint of
trade?
• (F) Is the ICC an “employers' association” within the meaning of the Act of 1974?
• (G) Is the TCCB an “employers' association” within the meaning of the Act?
• (H) If either or both of the ICC and the TCCB be “employers' associations,” does this itself bar
any cause of action that would otherwise exist?
• (I) In the light of the answers to the eight preceding questions, what relief (if any) should be given
to — (i) the individual plaintiffs and (ii) World Series Cricket?
I shall attempt to answer the last eight of these nine
questions at the end of my judgment and in the
same order. For convenience, however, I shall interpose
my answer to question (A) in the course of
the detailed recital of the facts of the case. Before
embarking on such recital, however, I think it will
be helpful at this stage first to summarise briefly
some of the voluminous evidence as to the organisation
and finances of cricket at first class level in
the Test-playing countries and secondly to summarise
the conditions under which cricketers in these
countries work.
IV [His Lordship considered the organisation and
finances of cricket at domestic first class level in
five of the Test-playing countries, i.e., United
Kingdom, Australia, India, New Zealand and West
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