*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

*302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ... *302 Greig and Others v Insole and Others 1977 G. No. 22461977 J ...

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[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 10 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 (Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302) ber country should pursue as soon as possible, in first class and other domestic cricket activities, the implementation of the decisions made in regard to Test Matches. Following this meeting of the ICC held on July 26, a meeting of the TCCB was due to be held on August 5, at which it was anticipated that a resolution would be proposed and passed effectively disqualifying from playing in any competitive county cricket match any cricketer who should for the time being be subject to the newly introduced Test Match ban. Such county cricket ban was proposed to operate for a period of two years immediately following the date of the last day of the last match previously disapproved by the ICC in which the player concerned had played or made himself available to play. The ICC Test Match ban by its very nature imposed a serious restriction on the fields in which those players who had contracted with World Series Cricket might thereafter seek employment as professional cricketers. The TCCB ban, if implemented, will be still more drastic in its effect. Of the players who have now entered into contracts with World Series Cricket, about 20 play English county cricket. Though there are certain other fields of employment possibly available to them, such as English league cricket (which does not enjoy first class status), English county cricket provides by far the most attractive form of regular employment for any cricketer who wishes to make his living out of playing cricket during the English summer. All three individual plaintiffs wish to continue playing county cricket and, in the absence of bans, will not be prevented from so doing by the arrangements which they have made with World Series Cricket. Furthermore, irrespective of any bans, Test Match cricket is probably no longer open to Mr. Snow, who is a fast bowler aged *312 35 years or to Mr. Procter, who is disqualified by reason of his South African nationality. Effectively, therefore, the proposed TCCB ban would prevent them from playing in first class cricket at all; and at least Mr. Procter has no qualifications to make his living in any other way. Mr. Alexander, in opening the case on behalf of the plaintiffs, described the county ban as illogical, because it deprives English cricket of leading players whose presence is important to the success of the game, dictatorial, because the TCCB is asserting the right to monopolise control over cricket and to stifle all competition, penal, because the TCCB is seeking to deprive those who play in World Series matches of the opportunity to make their living in the summer by playing first class cricket, and as challenging an elementary freedom, because by it the TCCB seeks drastically to restrict the way in which cricketers can earn their livings. The substantial financial rewards which the three individual plaintiffs will receive from World Series Cricket would no doubt compensate them to some extent for the loss of opportunities in other fields. There can, however, be no doubt as to the seriousness of the proposed bans so far as they are concerned and indeed in relation to many of the other players not parties to this action who have contracted with World Series Cricket. II The issue of proceedings, the relief sought and the amendment of the defences Against this background, the individual plaintiffs issued their writ in the first action on August 3, 1977. In this action they seek a declaration that the changes of rules by the ICC and proposed changes of rules by the TCCB would be ultra vires and an unlawful restraint of trade. Their claim in this action, however, is not one based solely on alleged restraint of trade. Further or in the alternative, they claim that the changes or proposed changes of rules are void as denying them “the right to work,” that is the freedom to practise their profession when, where and how they wish. This alternative plea becomes rather more significant in the light of the form of the amended defence to this action, to which I will shortly refer. Also on August 3 World Series Cricket issued its writ. The statement of claim in that action seeks not only declarations that the changes of rules are or would be void on the al- © 2011 Thomson Reuters.

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 11 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 (Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302) ternative grounds which I have stated, but also a declaration that they are or would be an unlawful inducement to the players involved to break their contracts with World Series Cricket. When the trial began, it was, I think, assumed by all parties to both actions (including the defendants themselves) that the claims involved and the defences to them would fall to be argued and decided without reference to any statutory legislation. By the fourth day of the trial, however, a possible new line of defence had occurred to the defendants' advisers. On that day they gave notice to the plaintiffs in both actions that they intended to apply for leave to amend their defences by pleading that each of them is an “employers' association” within the meaning of section 28 (2) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 , and relying on section 3 (5) in both actions and also, in the second action, on section 14 of that Act. In due course, in the face of some adverse comment but no opposition from the plaintiffs' counsel, the defendants were duly given such leave. Though I shall have to refer later to the statutory definition of “employers' association,” this will be a convenient moment to explain how the Act of 1974 may be relevant. *313 Subject to certain immaterial exceptions, section 14 of the Act provides: “(1)… no action in tort shall lie in respect of any act —(a)alleged to have been done … by or on behalf of an unincorporated employers' association; or …(c) alleged to be threatened or to be intended to be done as mentioned in paragraph ( a ) … above; against the … association in its own name … or against any members or officials of the … association on behalf of themselves and all other members of the … association.” By their alternative plea based on section 14 of the Act, the defendants in the second action in effect say that since, first, they are “employers' associations” and, secondly, an action for inducement of breach of contract is an action in tort, the claim based on inducement of breach of contract, however proved and justified it would otherwise be, is not maintainable, because the defendants enjoy a statutory immunity from this class of claim. If the defendants are correct in their assertion that they constitute “employers' associations,” such immunity must indisputably follow. Section 3 (5) of the Act confers on unincorporated “employers' associations” certain further, far-reaching immunities from the ordinary processes of the law. So far as material for present purposes, it provides: “… nor shall any rule of an unincorporated employers' association … be unlawful or unenforceable by reason only that it is in restraint of trade.” The defendants in both actions assert in effect that, if contrary to their contention, their new rules or proposed new rules would otherwise be unlawful as being in restraint of trade, section 3 (5) operates to render the new rules lawful. In this instance, however, the plaintiffs in each action have countered this assertion in argument not only by a refusal to accept that either of the defendants is an “employers' association,” but also by a submission that, in any event, the unlawfulness of the new or proposed new rules does not arise by reason only of their being “in restraint of trade” within the wording of the subsection. They submit in the alternative that the rules are invalid as denying the players involved the right to work and that invalidity arising on these particular grounds is not removed by section 3 (5) , when it is properly construed. It is common ground that, if the plaintiffs are to succeed on any cause of action, they must establish that all the essential elements necessary to establish such cause of action were present at the date when the writs were issued, August 3, 1977. This point of date has particular relevance in relation to the © 2011 Thomson Reuters.

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 Page 10<br />

[1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978) 122 S.J. 162 [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302 [1978] 3 All E.R. 449 (1978)<br />

122 S.J. 162<br />

(Cite as: [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302)<br />

ber country should pursue as soon as possible, in<br />

first class <strong>and</strong> other domestic cricket activities, the<br />

implementation of the decisions made in regard to<br />

Test Matches.<br />

Following this meeting of the ICC held on July 26,<br />

a meeting of the TCCB was due to be held on August<br />

5, at which it was anticipated that a resolution<br />

would be proposed <strong>and</strong> passed effectively disqualifying<br />

from playing in any competitive county cricket<br />

match any cricketer who should for the time being<br />

be subject to the newly introduced Test Match<br />

ban. Such county cricket ban was proposed to operate<br />

for a period of two years immediately following<br />

the date of the last day of the last match previously<br />

disapproved by the ICC in which the player concerned<br />

had played or made himself available to<br />

play.<br />

The ICC Test Match ban by its very nature<br />

imposed a serious restriction on the fields in which<br />

those players who had contracted with World Series<br />

Cricket might thereafter seek employment as professional<br />

cricketers. The TCCB ban, if implemented,<br />

will be still more drastic in its effect. Of the<br />

players who have now entered into contracts with<br />

World Series Cricket, about 20 play English county<br />

cricket. Though there are certain other fields of employment<br />

possibly available to them, such as English<br />

league cricket (which does not enjoy first class<br />

status), English county cricket provides by far the<br />

most attractive form of regular employment for any<br />

cricketer who wishes to make his living out of playing<br />

cricket during the English summer. All three individual<br />

plaintiffs wish to continue playing county<br />

cricket <strong>and</strong>, in the absence of bans, will not be prevented<br />

from so doing by the arrangements which<br />

they have made with World Series Cricket. Furthermore,<br />

irrespective of any bans, Test Match cricket<br />

is probably no longer open to Mr. Snow, who is a<br />

fast bowler aged *312 35 years or to<br />

Mr. Procter, who is disqualified by reason of his<br />

South African nationality. Effectively, therefore,<br />

the proposed TCCB ban would prevent them from<br />

playing in first class cricket at all; <strong>and</strong> at least Mr.<br />

Procter has no qualifications to make his living in<br />

any other way. Mr. Alex<strong>and</strong>er, in opening the case<br />

on behalf of the plaintiffs, described the county ban<br />

as illogical, because it deprives English cricket of<br />

leading players whose presence is important to the<br />

success of the game, dictatorial, because the TCCB<br />

is asserting the right to monopolise control over<br />

cricket <strong>and</strong> to stifle all competition, penal, because<br />

the TCCB is seeking to deprive those who play in<br />

World Series matches of the opportunity to make<br />

their living in the summer by playing first class<br />

cricket, <strong>and</strong> as challenging an elementary freedom,<br />

because by it the TCCB seeks drastically to restrict<br />

the way in which cricketers can earn their livings.<br />

The substantial financial rewards which the three<br />

individual plaintiffs will receive from World Series<br />

Cricket would no doubt compensate them to some<br />

extent for the loss of opportunities in other fields.<br />

There can, however, be no doubt as to the seriousness<br />

of the proposed bans so far as they are concerned<br />

<strong>and</strong> indeed in relation to many of the other<br />

players not parties to this action who have contracted<br />

with World Series Cricket.<br />

II The issue of proceedings, the relief sought <strong>and</strong><br />

the amendment of the defences<br />

Against this background, the individual plaintiffs<br />

issued their writ in the first action on August 3,<br />

<strong>1977</strong>. In this action they seek a declaration that the<br />

changes of rules by the ICC <strong>and</strong> proposed changes<br />

of rules by the TCCB would be ultra vires <strong>and</strong> an<br />

unlawful restraint of trade. Their claim in this action,<br />

however, is not one based solely on alleged restraint<br />

of trade. Further or in the alternative, they<br />

claim that the changes or proposed changes of rules<br />

are void as denying them “the right to work,” that is<br />

the freedom to practise their profession when,<br />

where <strong>and</strong> how they wish. This alternative plea becomes<br />

rather more significant in the light of the<br />

form of the amended defence to this action, to<br />

which I will shortly refer. Also on August 3 World<br />

Series Cricket issued its writ. The statement of<br />

claim in that action seeks not only declarations that<br />

the changes of rules are or would be void on the al-<br />

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

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