Republic of the SUPREME COURT En Banc PROF - Philippine ...

Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
En Banc
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, et al.,
Petitioners,
­ versus ­ G.R. NO. 171396
GLORIA MACAPAGAL­ARROYO, as President
and Commander­in­Chief, et al.,
Respondents.
x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG),
Petitioner,
­ versus ­ G.R. No. 171400
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, et al.,
Respondents.
x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x
NIÑEZ CACHO­OLIVARES, et al.,
Petitioners,
­ versus ­ G.R. No. 171409
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
et al.,
Respondents.
x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x
LOREN B. LEGARDA,
Petitioner,
­ versus ­ G.R. No. 171424
GLORIA MACAPAGAL­ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander­in­Chief, et al.,
Respondents.
x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its
Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG, et al.,
Petitioners,
­ versus ­ G.R. No. 171483
HER EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL­ARROYO, et al.,
Respondents.

x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, et al.,
Petitioners,
­ versus ­ G.R. No. 171485
EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive Secretary, et al.,
Respondents.
x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x
JOSE ANSELMO I. , et al.,
Petitioners,
­ versus ­ G.R. No. 171489
Honorable Executive Secretary EDUARDO
ERMITA, et al.,
Respondents.
x­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­x
MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION
RESPONDENTS, by counsel, respectfully move for the partial reconsideration of
this Honorable Court's Decision dated May 3, 2006, a copy of which was received by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on May 16, 2006.
PREFATORY
The words of the constitution do not have a narrow or constructed meaning, but
are used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies.[1] Benjamin N.
Cardozo was quoted to have said, “[t]he great generalities of the constitution have a
content and a significance that vary from age to age.”
These pronouncements vis­à­vis the words of Honorable Associate Justice Dante
O. Tinga in his dissenting opinion, to wit:
“The country­wide attention that the instant petitions have drawn
should not make the Court lose focus on its principal mission, which is to
settle the law of the case. On the contrary, the highly political nature of
these petitions should serve as forewarning for the Court to proceed ex

abundante cautelam, lest the institution be unduly dragged into the partisan
mud. The credibility of the Court is ensured by making decisions in
accordance with the Constitution without regard to the individual
personalities involved; with sights set on posterity, oblivious of the popular
flavor of the day.”
show exactly how jurisprudence is, or should be built.
This Motion for Partial Reconsideration reiterates the context under which
respondents acted – believing in good faith that theirs was a constitutional reaction to
thwart an unconstitutional and unpopular power­grab. This Honorable Court may, thus,
take judicial notice of the several destabilization attempts launched against the
government­ none has succeeded because the people were never part of them. The
exegesis of the assailed presidential issuances vis­à­vis the relevant constitutional
precepts must stand alongside the requirement of the times. Respondents are not
expected to trivialize the clear threats to the state of national peace and order while the
enemies of the State, acting like rats, slowly but surely nibble at this country’s political
framework. Respondents did not allow such occurrence as they performed their
mandated duties to prevent anarchy and save democracy. Certainly, this Honorable
Court would be one to appreciate their efforts in doing so, an appreciation that is to be
reflected in its pronouncements.
GROUNDS
I
The President may validly call upon the military to suppress “acts of
terrorism” notwithstanding the absence of a legal definition of the
term.
II

The issue of the alleged take­over of public utilities and businesses is
not a justiciable controversy.
III
The President’s exercise of emergency powers under Section 17 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution does not require prior delegation
by Congress.
IV
The decrees mentioned in Proclamation 1017 refer to those already
existing at the time of its issuance and never allude to any subsequent
issuances which the President may make for the duration of the state of
emergency.
V
The all­encompassing pronouncement that the acts committed by the
police in the implementation of Proclamation 1017 are illegal violates
the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
DISCUSSION
I. The President may validly call upon the military to
suppress “acts of terrorism” notwithstanding the
absence of a legal definition of the term.
Respondents respectfully move for the reconsideration of this Honorable Court’s
ruling which declares General Order No. 5 unconstitutional insofar as the President
called upon the military to prevent and suppress “acts of terrorism.” While there is no
dispute that Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism, it
is utterly inaccurate to conclude that the phrase “acts of terrorism” remains a vague and
amorphous concept.
First off, General Order No. 5 is not intended and does not even purport to define a
criminal act, as such authority belongs to the legislature alone. Instead, it is an
administrative measure calling for the implementation and exercise of discretion to carry

out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence. This means street­smartness and on­the­ground
assessment by the law enforcers of existing conditions and making decisions on the
proper course of action to repel violence and to stabilize critical situations. Hence, while
Congress has yet to enact a law that would define and punish acts of terrorism, terrorism
is already an overwhelming reality and a global concern. Its existence cannot simply be
ignored and is not contingent upon the enactment of legislation which defines and
punishes it. Terrorism is akin to a disease which though clinically undiagnosed can be
discerned by its effects on the people and the community. Such disease­like terrorism
need not be defined in the meantime so the State can act to forestall and defeat it. To be
sure, to await such legislative imprimatur in the face of an imminent threat of terrorism
would be to completely render ineffective the constitutionally mandated role of the
military to defend and protect the citizens under the direction of the President as the
Commander­in­Chief, particularly in times of emergency.
Indeed, a working definition of terrorism can be based upon accepted international
laws and principles regarding what behaviors are permitted and what constitute as “acts
of terrorism.”[2] So far, the United Nations has twelve (12) multilateral conventions and
protocols related to states’ responsibilities for combating terrorism.[3] These
Conventions differentiate between soldiers who attack a military adversary, and war
criminals who deliberately attack civilians. Significantly, research reveals that the

definition of terrorism has one common element: the deliberate use of violence against
civilians in order to attain political, ideological and religious aims .[4]
Article 2 of the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism
Financing defines an act of terrorism as:
1. xxx xxx (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.
The United States Patriot Act of 2001, Section 2331, defines terrorism in this wise:
(1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that –
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the or of any State;
(B) Appear to be intended –
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
(iii)
coercion; or
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the , or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished,
the persons appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which
their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that –
(1) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the or of any State;
(2) Appear to be intended –
(A)
(B)
(C)
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(D) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the .[5]
Other countries, i.e., , , , , , , , , and , refer to terrorism from the same standpoint.[6]

Similarly, the , which adheres to more or less the same fundamental ideologies as the
aforementioned countries, may address the concept and threat of terrorism from the
same perspective.
In terms of criminal law, many individual acts of terrorism are in themselves
crimes which are already defined and penalized by existing penal laws, i.e., murder,
hijacking of airplanes, boats, buses or other vehicles, acts of violence against persons in
authority, any crime committed with “the use of any weapon or dangerous device,” when
the intent of the crime is determined to be the endangerment of public safety or
substantial property damage rather than for “mere personal monetary gain.”[7] To quote
Justice Dante O. Tinga in his dissenting opinion, “Even without an operative law
specifically defining terrorism, the State already has the power to suppress and punish
such acts of terrorism, insofar as such acts are already punishable, as they almost always
are, in our extant general penal laws. The President, tasked with the execution of all
existing laws, already has a sufficient mandate to order the Armed Forces to combat
those acts of terrorism that are already punishable in our Revised Penal Code, such as
rebellion, coup d’ etat, murder, homicide, arson, physical injuries, grave threats, and the
like. Indeed, those acts which under normal contemplation would constitute terrorism
are associated anyway with or subsumed under lawless violence, which is a term found
in the Constitution itself. Thus long ago, the State has already seen it fit to punish such
acts.”

Within this spectrum, we cannot expect the Commander­in­Chief, on whose
shoulders lies the burden of protecting her constituents against an imminent threat to
their safety, to stand idle and concede helplessness in times of emergency, on the
premise that Congress is yet to define and penalize “acts of terrorism.” Curiously,
neither does the term “lawless violence” have a strict legal definition in our statutes. It so
happens that our Constitution and our laws are replete with this phrase, but simply
omitted the novel term: “acts of terrorism.”
Further, it cannot be reasonably assumed that law enforcers are given the unbridled
discretion in implementing the call to suppress “acts of terrorism,” for the sheer novelty
of the term in our legal system, or that it is void for being vague and overbroad. This
Honorable Court had, many times over in the past, rejected petitions seeking to nullify
nascent legal terms for allegedly being insufficient standards and for their vagueness and
overbreadth. Terms, such as “interest of law and order,”[8] “adequate and efficient
instruction,”[9] “public interest,”[10] “public convenience and welfare,”[11] “simplicity,
economy and efficiency,”[12]
“standardization and regulation of medical
education,”[13] and “fair and equitable employment practices,”[14] have been deemed
valid for being sufficient standards. Hence, with utmost respect, a phrase as common as
“acts of terrorism,” cannot be wisely stricken down for being vague or overbroad, on the
sole basis of lack of legal definition. “Acts of terrorism” by itself can be the legal

definition in this jurisdiction.
Respondents thus beseech this Honorable Court to reconsider its ruling that General
Order No. 5 is unconstitutional insofar as it calls upon the military to prevent and
suppress “acts of terrorism.”
II.
The issue on the alleged take­over of public
utilities and businesses is not a justiciable
controversy.
This Honorable Court’s ruling on the alleged take­over of the Daily Tribune is
uncalled for since there is no justiciable controversy insofar as the matter is concerned.
The truth is, there was no take­over to speak of and the Daily Tribune had never been
interrupted in its operations. There was no interference or censorship from the
government or any of its agencies. Thus, the purported take­over of the Daily Tribune
and its validity vis­a­vis Article XII Section 17 of the Constitution is in fact a non­issue.
As Justice Tinga elucidated in his dissent:
“…(I)t may be so that since PP 1017 did make express reference to Section 17,
Article XII, but it should be remembered that the constitutional provision refers to a twofold
power of the State to declare a national emergency and to take over such utilities
and enterprises. The first power under Section 17, Article XII is not distinct from the
power of the President, derived from other constitutional sources, to declare a state of
national emergency. Reference to Section 17, Article XII in relation to the power to
declare a state of national emergency is ultimately superfluous. A different situation
would obtain though if PP 1017 were invoked in the actual takeover of a utility or
business, and in such case, full consideration of the import of Section 17, Article XII
would be warranted. But no such situation obtains in this case, and any discussion
relating to the power of the State to take over a utility or business under Section 17,
Article XII would ultimately be obiter dictum”.
It is not binding as precedent.[15]

III. The President’s exercise of emergency powers under
Section 17 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
does not require prior delegation by Congress.
Respondents respectfully take exception to this Honorable Court’s pronouncement
that the emergency powers embodied under Section 17, Article XII can only be exercised
by the President with prior delegation by Congress. This is because unlike Section 23
(2) of Article VI, which necessitates congressional authority for the President to exercise
emergency powers, Section 17, Article XII does not so require. Hence, during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Jamir, who
proposed the addition of the words “under reasonable terms prescribed by it”, clarified
that the word “it” pertains to the State. When asked to clarify, he said that it refers to the
“appropriate agency.”[16] Constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas, in his Commentary,
concluded that the “appropriate agency” is the President herself. As he observed, Section
17 does not require that the authorization be “by law”, thus, the impression given is that
the authorization can come from the President herself.[17] Noteworthy is that Section 17
employs the words “take over,” “direct,” and “operation.” They are functions which call
for the execution of certain powers which, in the entire legal history, were never
exercised by these branches. By sheer process of deduction, these functions pertain to
neither the Judiciary nor the Legislative. Hence, they pertain to the executive.
Assuming arguendo that emergency powers need prior delegation from Congress,
surely this idea cannot be interpreted in its literal sense. As Honorable Associate Justice

Dante O. Tinga wisely pointed out in his dissenting opinion, “…it is constitutionally
permissible to recognize exceptions, such as in extreme situations wherein obtention of
congressional authority is impossible or inexpedient considering the emergency.”
Indeed, some emergency situations may be grave and imminent enough to render it
physically impossible for the Congress to convene in order to grant emergency powers to
the President. In this situation, the President must act promptly and decisively. At any
rate, no damage is done since her actions can later on be subjected to judicial scrutiny.
IV. The decrees mentioned in Proclamation 1017
refer to those already existing at the time of its
issuance. They do not allude to any subsequent
issuances which the President may make for
the duration of the state of emergency.
Contrary to this Honorable Court’s interpretation of Proclamation 1017’s enabling
clause, the President did not arrogate unto herself the power to enact statutes or
promulgate decrees. The pertinent provision reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, x x x do hereby command the Armed Forces of the , x x x
to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; x x x (emphasis supplied)
In striking down Proclamation 1017 insofar as it enforces obedience to all “decrees,”
this Honorable Court heavily relied on the supposed similarity of the above­quoted
provision with a phrase that is found in Proclamation No. 1081 of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Thus, this Honorable Court declared:
A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from Former
President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII,

Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire
Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under
martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander­in­Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction.
Proclamation No. 1081 granted then President Marcos legislative authority. Its
enabling clause states: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” On the other hand, the
enabling clause of Proclamation 1017 issued by the incumbent President is “to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.” Is it within the domain of the President to promulgate
“decrees?”
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the
following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. ­ Acts of the President providing for rules of a general
or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. ­ Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall
be promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. ­ Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. – Acts of the President on matters of

administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a
particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum
orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. – Acts of the President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or
some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. – Acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as Commander­in­Chief of the Armed Forces of the shall be issued as general
or special orders.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the President’s ordinance power is limited
to the foregoing issuances. She cannot, therefore, issue decrees similar to those issued
by then President Marcos under Proclamation 1081. And clearly she did not presume to
possess, much less arrogate upon herself, that power in Proclamation 1017. The text of
Proclamation 1017 was carefully crafted, thus: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.” “Laws” and “decrees” stand as a class separate from “orders” and
“regulations,” the latter of which the President has the power to issue. The use of “and”
establishes a connection between laws and decrees separate from orders and regulations,
thus allowing the application of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to construe “decrees” as
those decrees which at present have the force of law. The in­between comma further
indicates the separation of concepts between “laws and decrees” on one hand, and
“orders and regulations” on the other. This interpretation is consistent with another
fundamental principle in statutory construction wherein the use of the conjunction “and”
denotes a joinder or union, “relating the one to the other.”[18] In fact, during the

effectivity of Proclamation 1017, the President never issued or promulgated any decree
for that matter, a confirmation that the decrees mentioned in the proclamation refers to
those already existing at the time of its issuance and never allude to any subsequent
issuances which the President may make for the duration of the state of emergency.
At any rate, it is well settled that courts should defer not to the letter that killeth but
to the spirit that vivifieth to give effect to the lawmaker’s will.[19] Optima statuli
interpretatix est ipsum statutum. The intent of the statute should be ascertained from the
statute taken as a whole and not from an isolated part or provisions thereof.[20] Laws are
interpreted always in the context of the peculiar factual situation of each case, for each
case has its own flesh and blood and cannot be decided simply on the basis of isolated
clinical classroom principle. The circumstances of time, place, event, person and
particularly attendant circumstances and actions before, during and after the operative
fact should all be taken in their totality so that justice can be rationally and fairly
dispensed.[21]
V. The all­encompassing pronouncement that the
acts committed by the police in the
implementation of Proclamation 1017 are
illegal violates the constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process.
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." This safeguard includes
what is known as procedural due process that guarantees a procedure which, according

to Daniel Webster, "hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial,"[22] made more particular in the subsequent Section 14[a],
Article III of the 1987 Constitution: "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law".
Respondents respectfully submit that this Honorable Court may have taken steps too
many in its zeal to advance the Bill of Rights when it condemned the police officers of
conducting alleged illegal arrests and searches, particularly in the cases of Randy David,
the Daily Tribune and KMU.
The police officers – with no one being named in particular – were thus adjudged
violators of the rules on arrests and searches without the benefit of trial. While the
pronouncements could be described as mere opinions rather than dispositive statements
of guilt, however, they cannot escape contrary interpretation, as to the mind of any lower
court magistrate or investigating prosecutor, the decisions of this Honorable Court must
be obeyed, for they have the force and effect of law.[23]
The lower courts are
constantly reminded, under pain of being sanctioned for ignorance of law, to follow the
decisions of this Honorable Court.[24] Under these precepts, any police officer charged
before a trial court under the circumstances surrounding the instant case shall have been
prejudged by this Honorable Court's Decision.
Moreover, those having bitter spite against respondents could seize the
opportunity by filing charges against anyone they deem responsible – since this

Honorable Court did not name the violators – to the great disconcert of the entire
breadth of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. This
is most unfair.
Based on the foregoing, and as regards the pronouncement of illegality of the acts
committed by the police, the assailed Decision takes the form of a bill of attainder, the
essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of
guilt.[25] In the instant case, this Honorable Court has taken upon itself the
determination of factual matters which should be brought first under the judicial
determination of the trial courts.
Petitioners’ submissions through statements and news reports are insufficient to
defeat the presumption of innocence due to any accused individual. Significantly, the
hypothetical statements of the Solicitor General during the oral arguments are not
categorical admissions of the illegal acts allegedly committed by the police in
implementing Proclamation 1017.
His statements were rather premised on an
assumption that if indeed illegal acts were committed, these police officers may be
prosecuted under the appropriate law wherein evidence is still necessarily required to
prove the supposed transgressions. There can never be a declaration of guilt based on
assumed facts and hypothetical pronouncements without the benefit of trial. Otherwise,
it is a patent violation of the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence and

the right to due process of law.
Besides, these questions are evidentiary and factual which this Honorable Court is
not a trier of.
It bears stressing that the instant case stemmed from original actions for certiorari
and prohibition filed directly with this Honorable Court. Thus, even if the issue on the
alleged illegality of police actions was raised, there is completely no basis in making
factual determinations and conclusions of law relative thereto. In the absence of such
prior determination of facts by a lower court, this Honorable Court must refer the matter
to the appropriate trial courts to receive evidence amidst proper proceedings.[26]
Assuming that the news reports and accounts of petitioners were true, the persons
involved are nonetheless entitled to a fair trial as a matter of right. As aptly stated by the
Honorable Associate Justice Tinga, citing Teves v. Sandiganbayan,[27] “even an accused
who murders another in front of live television cameras broadcast to millions of sets is
not yet necessarily guilty of the crime of murder or homicide.”
At any rate, respondents respectfully submit that the issue of legality or illegality of
the assailed police actions was not brought to fore. This is apparent from the document
issued by this Honorable Court entitled “ADVISORY ON ORAL ARGUMENT
SCHEDULED ON MARCH 7, 2006 AT 1:00 P.M.” dated 06 March 2006, which
outlined the pertinent issues involved in the instant case:
1. Is PP 1017 void on its face?
2. Is it void as applied to the alleged illegal arrest of Petitioners David and Llamas

and the revocation of all permits to rally?
3. Is PP 1017 void as applied to the alleged raid and ransacking of the offices of
The Daily Tribune without warrant and without informing petitioners of the police
operation?
4. Did it justify alleged military and/or police presence in media establishments?
5. Is PP 1017 void for allegedly usurping/impairing legislative powers and for
being an alleged subterfuge for a declaration of martial law?
6. Did it validate the alleged illegal arrest of Reps. Teodoro Casino, Rafael
Mariano, Liza Maza, Satur Ocampo and Joel Virador?
7. Is PP 1017 void for being allegedly overbroad and/or vague?
8. Is it void as applied to the alleged illegal arrest of Rep. Crispin Beltran?
9. May the Supreme Court review the factual bases of PP 1017?
10. Was there a “clear and present danger” that necessitated its issuance?
11. Is PP 1017 void for the alleged usurpation of the power of the STATE to authorize
a state of national emergency under Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution?
12. Is it void for its alleged lack of publication?
13. Is PP 1017 void for the alleged violation of her right to prosecute her election
protest
14. Is it void on any other ground(s) not mentioned above?
15. Should the seven Petitions be dismissed on the ground of mootness?
16. Do Petitioners Alternative Law Groups, Inc. et al.; Jose Anselmo Cadiz et al.;
Kilusang Mayo Uno; Francis G. Escudero et al.; and Loren B. Legarda have legal
standing?
17. Was it necessary to implead the President in these actions?
Likewise, the unnamed police officers must be accorded the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty. The police were acting in their capacity as
such when they performed the assailed actions. Their actions cannot be considered
capricious or whimsical. The public demonstrations were timed to coincide with the
withdrawal of support from the Executive Branch of some military officers. Rally
organizers and participants blocked EDSA, a major thoroughfare by marching through
its breadth while others massed up in other areas. Arrests had to be made to prevent the
confluence of events that could then lead to a coup d’ etat which was imminently
unfolding at that volatile situation. At those very critical times, the law enforcers had to
act decisively and with dispatch, otherwise anarchy would prevail and the State’s

sovereignty would be exposed to great peril. In sum, the police acted in accordance with
their mandate to prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence whose malevolent claws
were preying at our country at that very moment. Theirs was a rational exercise of
discretion and judgment call which they, as police officers were trained to apply and
carry out during critical situations. The respondents’ detailed narration of events leading
to the issuance of Proclamation 1017, to wit: (a) the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D­Day, (b) the defections in the military, particularly in
the Philippine Marines, and (c) the reproving statements from the communist leaders,
which this Honorable Court took judicial notice of for failure of the petitioners to refute
the same, are concrete proofs and confirmation of the lawless violence and terrorist acts
which must be suppressed by the law enforcers. It is, therefore, inconsistent for this
Honorable Court to label the performance of the police officers of their mandated
function as illegal after they had successfully quelled the lawlessness and impending
coup d’ etat through necessary and appropriate measures.
The search of the premises of the Daily Tribune was also reasonable under the
prevailing circumstances then. The destabilizers were using this media outlet as a
mouthpiece for their propaganda. Had the police not secured the Daily Tribune’s
administrative office, the rebellious forces could have gained ground in their attempts to
incite sedition among the populace.
The rule is, where the purpose is to nullify governmental acts whether as

unconstitutional or done with grave abuse of discretion, there is a strong presumption in
favor of the validity of such acts. The heavy onus is on petitioners to overcome the
presumption of regularity.[28] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption stands. So must it be in this case.
CONCLUSION
Presidential powers and prerogative are not derived solely from a particular
constitutional clause or article or from an express statutory grant. Their limits are likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables. History and
time­honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to the Executive Branch
certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many
terms are applied to these powers: “residual,” “inherent,” “moral,” “implied,”
“aggregate,” “emergency.” Whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers do
exist, as they must if the government function of the Executive Branch is to be carried
out effectively and efficiently.[29]
Measured against the above pronouncement, it is respectfully submitted that the
validity of the pertinent provisions in Proclamation 1017 and General Order No. 5 struck
down by this Honorable Court must necessarily be upheld and sustained.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that this motion for

partial reconsideration be granted and respondents be granted other forms of relief, just
and equitable under the premises.
Respectfully submitted.
, May 21, 2006.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Solicitor General
Roll No. 22252
IBP Lifetime Roll No. 0386
AMY C. LAZARO­JAVIER
Assistant Solicitor General
Roll No. 32512
IBP No. 1411 (Lifetime Membership)
A. BAYOT­QUIAMBAO
Solicitor
Roll No. 41038
IBP OR No. 671801, 1­09­06
STEVENSON C. TUASON
Associate Solicitor
Roll No. 49704
IBP No. 05753 (Lifetime Membership)
MARGARITA EUGENIA F. VICTORINO
Associate Solicitor
Roll No. 50489
IBP No. 05389 (Lifetime Membership)
BEULAH COELI C. FIEL
Associate Solicitor
Roll No. 51025
IBP OR No. 672066 – 1.09.06
JAMES M. IMBONG
Associate Solicitor
Roll No. 51157
IBP OR No. 671825 – 1.09.06
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
,
Copy furnished:
ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.

ATTY. ROGER R. RAYEL
ATTY. ROMEL R. BAGARES
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EXPLANATION
(Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure)
The foregoing Motion is being served by registered mail due to lack of
messengerial personnel in the OSG to effect personal service.
MYRA A. BAYOT­QUIAMBAO
Solicitor
[1] Occeña v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 755 [1980]
[2] Section 2, Article II, Constitution.
[3] 1) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft signed at
Tokyo, on 14 September 1963 (Tokyo Convention); (2)Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft Signed At The Hague, On 16 December 1970(The Hague Convention 1970); (3)
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal
Convention)U.N.T.S. No. 14118, vol. 974, pp. 178­184, Entry Into Force: 26 January 1973; (4)
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons
(Opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973.); (5) International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention, 1979); (6) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (Nuclear Materials Convention, 1980), Signed at New York and Vienna, 3 March 1980; (7)
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation (1971)Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, (1988); (8) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, Signed at Rome, 10 March 1988; (9) Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Signed at Rome
10 March 1988; (10) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification
SIGNED AT MONTREAL, ON 1 MARCH 1991 (MONTREAL CONVENTION 1991); (11)
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, (New York : 12 January 1998)
(UN General Assembly Resolution); (12) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism (1999) (UN General Assembly Resolution).
[4] Ibid; Proposed Definitions of Terrorism, Academic Consensus Definition,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html;
[5] http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002331­­­­000­.html
[6] The Australian Criminal Code Act of 1995 (Criminal Code), as amended by The
Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act of 2002 defines a terrorist act as:

(Α) an action or threat of action that causes serious physical harm or death to a person, or endangers a
person’s life or involves serious risk to public health or safety, serious damage to property or serious
interference with essential electronic systems; and
(Β) the action is done or threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or
ideological cause and to coerce or influence by intimidation an Australian or foreign government or
intimidate the public or a section of the public.
Canada’s Criminal Code, as amended by the Anti Terrorism Act 2001 (ATA), defines terrorism as an action
that takes place either within or outside of Canada which is an offence under the United Nations (UN) Conventions and
Protocols; or is committed or threatened for political, religious or ideological purposes and intended to intimidate the public
or compel a government to do or refrain from doing an act by killing, seriously harming or endangering a person, causing
substantial property damage that is likely to seriously harm people or by interfering with or disrupting an essential service,
facility or system. Under the ATA, a terrorist group is defined as an entity that has as one of its purposes or activities the
facilitating or carrying out of terrorist activity or that is an entity set out in a list established by regulation.
In , Acts of terrorism are a criminal offence and are set out in Articles 421­1 et seq. of the Penal Code (as
amended in Law 96­647 of ). The offences which constitute acts of terrorism are those which are committed intentionally
and undertaken by an individual or collective with the purpose of seriously disturbing the public order through intimidation
or terror by means of: willful attacks on life, willful attacks on the physical integrity of persons, abduction, hijacking of
planes or vessels, theft, extortion, destruction, defacement and damage, and also computer offences; the production or
keeping or sale or transport of machines, dangerous or explosive devices or substances; the detention, carrying and transport
of weapons and ammunition; offences related to the prohibition of the designing, production, keeping, stocking, purchase or
sale of biological or toxin­based weapons.
Under Greece’ Law 3251/2004 terrorism is defined as: an act committed in such a way or to such an extent or
under such circumstances that it could seriously damage a country or an international organisation, and is aimed at inducing
fear among the population or forcing illegally any public authority or international organisation to proceed to any act or to
refrain from proceeding to it or to seriously harm or destroy the fundamental constitutional, political or economic structure
of a country or an international organisation. The law cites 22 types of offences considered as terrorist acts when committed
under the above criteria. These include murder, serious bodily injury, abduction, offences linked to the possession of
explosives or chemical substances, food adulteration, water poisoning etc. However, acts that aim at establishing a
democratic regime or at defending or restoring such a regime as well as acts committed in the exercise of fundamental civil,
political or any other rights provided for by the Constitution or the ECHR are deemed not to be terrorist acts.
In Italy, the definition of terrorism in Article 270 bis of the Italian Penal Code has been widened by Law
155/2005, which came into force on 2 August 2005, and includes promoting, constituting, organising, managing or
financing organisations which intend to carry out violent activities, or assisting any individual (excluding a close relative)
who participates in such organisations. It also includes enrolling or training individuals to carry out violent activities if, in
view of their nature or context, such activities might cause grave harm to a country or international organisation, and are
intended to intimidate the population or to constrain the powers of the state or international organisations to carry out or not
carry out any activity, or to destabilise or destroy fundamental political, constitutional, economic and social structures of a
country or of an international organisation. This includes foreign states and international organisations or institutions. This
definition is in addition to other acts defined as terrorism or as carried out for terrorist purposes in international conventions
or laws to which is bound.
In June 2002 amended the Penal Code with a view to establishing effective legislative measures against acts of
terrorism and the financing of such acts. The amended section 147a now defines terrorism as a criminal act committed with
the intention of: seriously disrupting a function of vital importance to society, such as legislative, executive or judicial
authority, power supply, safe supply of food or water, the bank or monetary system or emergency medical services or disease
control; seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling public authorities or an intergovernmental organisation to
perform, tolerate or abstain from performing any act of crucial importance for the country or organisation, or for another
country or another intergovernmental organisation.
does not have specific anti­terrorism laws. The general approach is to treat terrorism as an aggravated form of
crime. Terrorism­related offences are set out in the Penal Code and procedural provisions in the Law of Criminal Procedure.
The Penal Code states that an act constitutes a terrorist offence where the purpose of the act is to subvert the constitutional
order or to effect serious disturbances of public order.
Sweden’s 2003 Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences states that a list of offences under Swedish
law including murder, manslaughter, gross assault, kidnapping, the spreading of poison or contagious substances amount to
a terrorist offence where the act in question might seriously damage a state or an intergovernmental organisation and the

intent of the act is to: seriously intimidate a population or a group of population; unduly compel a public authority or an
intergovernmental organisation to perform an act or abstain from acting; seriously destabilise or destroy fundamental
political, constitutional, economic or social structures in a state or in an intergovernmental organisation. If it is not possible
to prove special intent, regular criminal law in the Penal Code is applicable. Any attempt, preparation or conspiracy to
commit a terrorist offence or failure to disclose such an offence is also deemed an offence under this Act.
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/QS%20Draft%2010%20FINAL1.pdf
[7] http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa121201a.htm
[8] Rubi v. Provincial Board of , 39 Phil. 660 [1919]
[9] Philippine Association of Colleges and University v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806
[1955]
[10] People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.328 [1939]
[11] Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil.726 [1940]
[12] Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359 [1952]
[13] Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 731 [1987]
[14] 243 SCRA 666 [1995]
[15] Black’s Law Dictionary, 967 5 th ed. 1979
[16] Record, Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, page 647.
[17] Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Commentary, 2003 Edition, page 1183.
[18] R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3 rd ed. (1995) at 206.
[19] Alonzo v. IAC, 150 SCRA 259
[20] Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 459
[21] Philippine Today, Inc. v. NLRC, 267 SCRA 202
[22] Pagasian v. Judge Azura, 184 SCRA 391[1990]
[23] Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]
[24] Aurillo v. Francisco et al., 235 SCRA 283 [1994]
[25] People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]
[26] New Owners/Management of TML garments, Inc. v. , 170 SCRA 563 [1989]
[27] 447 SCRA 309 [2004]
[28] Constantino, Jr., v. Cuisia, et al., 472 SCRA 505 [2005]
[29] Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668