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Decision 36 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171400 171409, 171424, 171483 171485, 171489 1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order… 2) …the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator… 3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its termination… 4) …all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements… 5) … no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . . 6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect… 7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . . 8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . . 9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . . 10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted… 11) …the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship… 99 Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, 99 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, pp. 298- 306.
Decision 37 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171400 171409, 171424, 171483 171485, 171489 and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees. 100 Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, “the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory.” To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term “dictator” is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering emergency powers. However used, “constitutional dictatorship” cannot be divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the “concept of constitutionalism” articulated by Charles H. McIlwain: A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with “limited” as distinguished from “weak” government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed. 101 In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists –- from Lock’s “theory of prerogative,” to Watkins’ 100 Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 11. 101 Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972, p. 12.
Page 1 and 2: EN BANC PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LOR
Page 3 and 4: Decision 3 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171400
Page 35: Decision 35 G.R. Nos. 171396, 17140
Page 77: Decision 77 G.R. Nos. 171396, 17140

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