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Decision 34<br />
G.R. Nos. 171396,<br />
171400<br />
171409, 171424, 171483<br />
171485, 171489<br />
Nicollo Machiavelli’s view of emergency powers, as one element in<br />
the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic contrast to the<br />
Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this<br />
chasm in democratic political theory, thus:<br />
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to<br />
resort to extra –constitutional measures; for although they may for a time<br />
be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once<br />
established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded<br />
under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be<br />
perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for<br />
every emergency and fixed rules for applying it. 89<br />
Machiavelli – in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill – sought to<br />
incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency<br />
powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national<br />
danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a<br />
capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of<br />
emergency, with effective constitutional restraints. 90<br />
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the<br />
problem of response to emergency by constitutional democracies, have<br />
employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship. 91 Frederick M. Watkins<br />
saw “no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the<br />
defense of liberal institutions,” provided it “serves to protect established<br />
institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of<br />
temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the<br />
previous forms of political life.” 92 He recognized the two (2) key elements<br />
of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional<br />
governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at<br />
the same time “imposing limitation upon that power.” 93 Watkins placed<br />
89<br />
The Discourses, Bk. 1, Ch. XXXIV.<br />
90<br />
Smith and Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises, 1972. p. 8.<br />
91<br />
Ibid.<br />
92<br />
See The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 328.<br />
93<br />
Ibid., p. 353.