EN BANC

Decision 30
G.R. Nos. 171396,
171400
171409, 171424, 171483
171485, 171489
balances, “under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when
he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and
the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested
in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in
turn, constitutionally supreme.” 76
Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile. 77
In 1973, the unanimous Court of
There, the Court was
almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the
imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. 78 Then came
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that
there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that “in times of
war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute
control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great
peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the
People, and God.” 79
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora 80 -- a recent case
most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang.
While the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that “this does
not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” This ruling is mainly a
76
Lansang v. Garcia, supra, pp. 473 and 481.
77
Supra.
78
“Five Justices – Antonio, Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, and Aquino – took the position that the
proclamation of martial law and the arrest and detention orders accompanying the proclamation posed a
“political question” beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Justice Antonio, in a separate opinion concurred in
by Makasiar, Fernandez, and Aquino, argued that the Constitution had deliberately set up a strong
presidency and had concentrated powers in times of emergency in the hands of the President and had given
him broad authority and discretion which the Court was bound to respect. He made reference to the decision
in Lansang v. Garcia but read it as in effect upholding the “political question” position. Fernandez, in a
separate opinion, also argued Lansang, even understood as giving a narrow scope of review authority to the
Court, affirmed the impossible task of ‘checking’ the action taken by the President. Hence, he advocated a
return to Barcelon v. Baker. Similarly, Esguerra advocated the abandonment of Lansang and a return to
Barcelon. And, although Justices Castro, Fernando, Muñoz- Palma, and, implicitly, Teehankee, lined up on
the side of justiciability as enunciated in Lansang, x x x Barredo, however, wanted to have the best of
both worlds and opted for the view that “political questions are not per se beyond the Court’s jurisdiction ...
but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with
the Executive’s Proclamation.” (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 794.)
79
See Separate Opinion of J. Puno in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra.
80
Supra.