i Report Issue No. 3 2005 - Philippine Center for Investigative ...

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RUNNING ON TAXPAYERS’ MO LUZ RIMBAN HOW MUCH does it cost to become president? Seasoned politicians and political observers say the price tag of the presidency these days could be anywhere from a low of P2 billion to a high of P8 billion. That’s how much is needed to finance nationwide campaign rallies over a three-month period, produce assorted election paraphernalia, fund multimedia advertisements, subsidize the campaigns of senatorial and local candidates, pay campaign staff, commission surveys, and, if there’s enough left, feed election watchers and volunteers for the duration of the count, which could last for weeks. Where in the world does anyone get that much money? No wonder the country went broke after the 2004 polls, with a fiscal crisis threatening the economy a mere few months after the elections. But then it’s always been that way. Most incumbents who ran for re-election have made Filipino taxpayers foot their campaign expenses. In 1969, in what is still touted as the costliest and dirtiest of Philippine elections till then, the incumbent Ferdinand Marcos spared no expense to get himself re-elected. Massive election spending that year triggered a balance of payments crisis and a currency devaluation. Fortunately, the 1987 Constitution banned presidents from running for a second term. An incumbent, after all, has power over the government’s vast organization and resources, including the funds in the national treasury intended for government services. He or she therefore has a built-in advantage no other candidate can equal. Traditionally, the biggest donors to presidential campaigns have been Chinese-Filipino businessmen, but even they put together are unlikely to come up with all the billions needed to fill a campaign chest. The biggest donor to the 2004 presidential campaign could have been none other than the Filipino taxpayer. This was where Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo edged out her rivals. In the weeks before and during the campaign, billions in government funds were released as doleouts to local officials, signaling that the incumbent was giving out largesse to those who would support her, amounts that the opposition could not possibly equal. Large sums were also made available in thinlydisguised projects to promote Arroyo’s candidacy, including the dissemination of millions of government-funded health-insurance cards (with the president’s photo imprinted on them), the distribu- 12 PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM I REPORT
C A M P A I G N F U N D S Buying votes. In the 2004 elections, President Arroyo used government funds to win the loyalty of local officials and the affection of voters. NEY tion of free rice and fertilizers, the emergency employment of thousands of street sweepers, and the nationwide display of road signs bearing the president’s name. Today the public is being treated to the spectacle of witness after witness spewing out exposés about the president and her family using jueteng money to fund the election. In reality, the state funds used for Arroyo’s election campaign dwarf the alleged jueteng contributions. By our estimates, at least P5 billion could have been pooled from various government agencies to oil Arroyo’s campaign machinery. Farmers’ groups allege that even part of the confiscated Marcos wealth was used for projects to advance the president’s re-election. In comparison, the most sensational claims so far have been that jueteng lord Rodolfo ‘Bong’ Pineda contributed P300 million to the Arroyo campaign. It took years to lay the groundwork for mobilizing government resources for the president’s re-election. It entailed, first of all, the appointment of allies to government agencies with pots of funds that could be tapped for the campaign. It also entailed the identification of those funds and their release at the right time. Such strategic planning, in the words of Senator Sergio Osmeña III, “was so systematic, it’s mind boggling.” WHERE THE MONEY CAME FROM Most of the fund releases began in early February, just before the start of the 90-day campaign for the presidency, and continued till April. But huge chunks of money were already released to local officials even in late 2003. The amounts involved are huge, and they included the following: ● On February 2, 2004, Labor Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas, in her capacity as chairperson of the Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration (OWWA), along with then OWWA Administrator Virgilio Angelo signed a resolution transferring P530 million from the OWWA medicare fund to the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. This amount was used to subsidize the Philhealth cards given away in places where Arroyo campaigned. ● On February 3, 2004, Budget Secretary Emilia Boncodin signed a Special Allotment Release Order or SARO addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (DA) for P728 million. The amount was “to cover the purchase of farm inputs,” and was classified as an additional program. The amount was distributed to mayors, governors, and congressmen. ● On February 11, 2004, Boncodin signed another SARO for the DA, making available P1.1 billion “to cover the GMA Rice and Corn and Livestock Program.” Again, the amount was disbursed to mayors, governors, and congressmen. ● On March 23, 2004, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) released to the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) P541 million from the Marcos wealth supposedly for activities in connection with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. That fund, which was allegedly used for the campaign, has yet to be accounted for. ● On April 10, 2004, the president issued an executive order instructing that the poorest families be identified and that those with college-age children be given P10,000-vouchers each that they can use for technical or college education. ● On April 28, 2004, the DBM also informed the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), of the release of P544 million “to cover funding requirements for the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) Rice Program.” This amount, too, came from the Marcos wealth. This fund was more than what was actually needed for the purpose. The program has yet to be completed, and farmers’ groups suspect that a large portion of the funds was diverted for election purposes. ● As early as November 2003, Arroyo and then Public Works Secretary Florante Soriquez began what is known as the “Kalsada Natin, Alagaan Natin” program, from which numerous posters, billboards and road signs bearing Arroyo’s In aid of re-election. Philhealth cards (above) were given out during elections so poor voters can get medical services for free. name and face were funded. Opposition leaders are saying P1.4 billion from the Motor Vehicles’ Users Charge was used for election purposes. (An interesting aside: on January 14, 2004, Secretary of the Cabinet Ricardo Saludo issued a memo instructing cabinet secretaries “to change the word PGMA to ‘President Gloria’ in all billboards and notices of the president’s programs and projects.” Apparently, many people didn’t know what PGMA stood for. Saludo warned, “The PNP shall monitor and validate the change within the next two weeks.”) ● In mid-2003, the Department of Agriculture headed at that time by Luis Lorenzo transferred P423 million in funds to the National Food Authority then headed by Arthur Yap to buy fertilizers under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) Rice Program. Some of the disbursements from this fund were given in cash to congressmen and local officials. It is hard to make an exact accounting of other government funds used to finance Arroyo’s campaign. For one, it is difficult to tell which expenditures were incurred in the natural course of her work as president and which went to promoting her candidacy. For instance, cabinet secretaries were actively involved in the Arroyo campaign. Former Social Welfare and Development Secretary Corazon ‘Dinky’ Soliman herself admits the town hall meetings dubbed “Pulong Bayan” that Arroyo conducted during the campaign were organized by the DSWD from funds provided by PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM I REPORT 13
Page 1: i REPORT July-September 2005 P75 Ph
Page 4 and 5: SHEILA S. CORONEL NO TWO presidents
Page 6 and 7: Tobacco, the country’s biggest ci
Page 8 and 9: THE TWO FACES OF GMA. Aides say tha
Page 10 and 11: likewise rebutted Zuce’s charges.
Page 12: T H E C A M P A I G N Presidential
Page 17 and 18: C A M P A I G N F U N D S On March
Page 19 and 20: T H E V I C E P R E S I D E N T WHO
Page 22 and 23: HAPPY DAYS ARE HERE AGAIN? In 1998,
Page 24 and 25: legislators have given themselves p
Page 26 and 27: LIGHTS, CAMERA, IMPEACHMENT! ALECKS
Page 28 and 29: For Visayans, the center does not h
Page 30 and 31: The Moro people can be part of a pl
Page 32 and 33: TWO AT EDSA ‘When the wheels of h
Page 34 and 35: FOCUS ON FILIPINO YOUTH DEFYING THE
Page 36: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N d
Page 39 and 40: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N K
Page 41 and 42: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N s
Page 43 and 44: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N d
Page 45 and 46: Stay, serve poor first, Stay, serve
Page 47 and 48: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N l
Page 49 and 50: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N W
Page 51 and 52: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N m
Page 53 and 54: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N a
Page 55 and 56: le Up le lim CHANGING FACE. Muslim
Page 58 and 59: FOCUS ON FILIPINO YOUTH ALECKS P. P
Page 60: T H E L O S T G E N E R A T I O N a
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GRASSROOTS GAME Jueteng has deep ro
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