Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
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In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must be a concurrence of (1)<br />
residence (physical presence) in the new locality and (2) an intention to remain there<br />
This state also has a significant interest in having its law applied to its divorce<br />
decree, which still governs the matter of child support obligations between two of this<br />
state’s citizens.<br />
a number of courts have declined to apply either a newly enacted age of majority or<br />
another state’s age of majority to a preexisting support decree. These cases reason<br />
that at the time the support agreement was issued, the parties intended the age of<br />
majority in support orders to mean the age of majority existing when the support<br />
order originated.<br />
The habitation or residence of a minor child is, by operation of law, determined and<br />
fixed by that of the parent legally entitled to the custody and control of the child<br />
unless the parent has voluntarily surrendered such right.<br />
The only way Eva could acquire a Kansas domicile is by becoming emancipated.<br />
The emancipation of a child by a parent may be proved by circumstantial evidence<br />
or may be implied from the conduct of the parties<br />
Wills v. Wills, 16 Neb. App. 559, 745 N.W.2d 924 (2008)<br />
Facts: 1992 New Mexico divorce. Dad to pay child support until children emancipate under<br />
NM law (age 18). Later both parents and the children move to NE, and Mom has NE court<br />
modify, and resets emancipation age to 19. Held: No can do! The court takes an extensive<br />
look into the various UIFSA amendments, and the official commentary accompanying those<br />
amendments, in reaching its decision.<br />
Section 42-746 states, in pertinent part:<br />
I Except as otherwise provided in section 42-747.03, a tribunal of this state<br />
shall not modify any aspect of a child support order that cannot be modified<br />
under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation<br />
of support. . . .<br />
(d) In a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is<br />
determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of<br />
the obligation of support. The obligor’s fulfillment of the duty of support<br />
established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support<br />
by a tribunal of this state.<br />
Despite a basic difference in the nature of the case, we rely upon the decision in<br />
Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525, 600 N .W.2d 159 (1999), for guiding principles.<br />
… First, we properly look to the official comments contained in a model act on which<br />
a <strong>Nebraska</strong> statute or series of statutes was patterned for some guidance in an effort<br />
to ascertain the intent of the legislation. … Second, dicta in Groseth supports our<br />
interpretation. Third, a court must look to a statute’s purpose and give to the statute<br />
a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a<br />
construction which would defeat it.<br />
A comment to the 2001 UIFSA amendments…(states): The fact that the State of the<br />
new controlling order has a different duration of for [sic] child support is specifically<br />
declared to be irrelevant by UIFSA. … This comment refers to the 2001 amendment<br />
to UIFSA § 611 adding a new section (d), which was, in turn, adopted essentially<br />
verbatim by the <strong>Nebraska</strong> Legislature as the current § 42-746(d). Section 42-476I<br />
was also amended to expressly refer to the duration of the obligation of support as<br />
an aspect that cannot be modified under the law of the issuing state.<br />
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