Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must be a concurrence of (1)
residence (physical presence) in the new locality and (2) an intention to remain there
This state also has a significant interest in having its law applied to its divorce
decree, which still governs the matter of child support obligations between two of this
state’s citizens.
a number of courts have declined to apply either a newly enacted age of majority or
another state’s age of majority to a preexisting support decree. These cases reason
that at the time the support agreement was issued, the parties intended the age of
majority in support orders to mean the age of majority existing when the support
order originated.
The habitation or residence of a minor child is, by operation of law, determined and
fixed by that of the parent legally entitled to the custody and control of the child
unless the parent has voluntarily surrendered such right.
The only way Eva could acquire a Kansas domicile is by becoming emancipated.
The emancipation of a child by a parent may be proved by circumstantial evidence
or may be implied from the conduct of the parties
Wills v. Wills, 16 Neb. App. 559, 745 N.W.2d 924 (2008)
Facts: 1992 New Mexico divorce. Dad to pay child support until children emancipate under
NM law (age 18). Later both parents and the children move to NE, and Mom has NE court
modify, and resets emancipation age to 19. Held: No can do! The court takes an extensive
look into the various UIFSA amendments, and the official commentary accompanying those
amendments, in reaching its decision.
Section 42-746 states, in pertinent part:
I Except as otherwise provided in section 42-747.03, a tribunal of this state
shall not modify any aspect of a child support order that cannot be modified
under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation
of support. . . .
(d) In a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is
determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of
the obligation of support. The obligor’s fulfillment of the duty of support
established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support
by a tribunal of this state.
Despite a basic difference in the nature of the case, we rely upon the decision in
Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb. 525, 600 N .W.2d 159 (1999), for guiding principles.
… First, we properly look to the official comments contained in a model act on which
a Nebraska statute or series of statutes was patterned for some guidance in an effort
to ascertain the intent of the legislation. … Second, dicta in Groseth supports our
interpretation. Third, a court must look to a statute’s purpose and give to the statute
a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a
construction which would defeat it.
A comment to the 2001 UIFSA amendments…(states): The fact that the State of the
new controlling order has a different duration of for [sic] child support is specifically
declared to be irrelevant by UIFSA. … This comment refers to the 2001 amendment
to UIFSA § 611 adding a new section (d), which was, in turn, adopted essentially
verbatim by the Nebraska Legislature as the current § 42-746(d). Section 42-476I
was also amended to expressly refer to the duration of the obligation of support as
an aspect that cannot be modified under the law of the issuing state.
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