Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
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Finally, we conclude that for future cases, the standard of proof in civil contempt<br />
proceedings is clear and convincing evidence, unless the Legislature has<br />
mandated another standard.<br />
Civil contempt proceedings are ‘”instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of<br />
private parties to the suit and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made to<br />
enforce the rights and to administer the remedies to which the court has found them<br />
to be entitled . . . , ‘” Civil contempt proceedings are remedial and coercive in their<br />
nature.<br />
“[T]he power to punish for contempt of court is a power inherent in all courts of<br />
general jurisdiction, . . . independent of any special or express grant of statute.”<br />
<strong>Nebraska</strong> courts, through their inherent judicial power, have the authority to do all<br />
things reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice. And this<br />
authority exists apart from any statutory grant of authority.<br />
Because of the court’s continuing equity jurisdiction over the [divorce] decree, the<br />
power to provide equitable relief in a contempt proceeding is particularly<br />
appropriate.<br />
a court cannot modify a dissolution decree in a contempt proceeding absent an<br />
application for a modification and notice that a party seeks modification.<br />
if a complainant seeks, or a court is considering, a modification of the underlying<br />
decree as an equitable sanction for contempt of the court’s decree, the alleged<br />
contemnor must first have notice that a modification and a finding of contempt will be<br />
at issue. But when the alleged contemnor has notice and an opportunity to be<br />
heard, a court can modify the underlying decree as a remedy for contempt if the<br />
violation cannot be adequately remedied otherwise.<br />
a coercive contempt sanction is conditioned upon the contemnor’s continued<br />
noncompliance with a court order; i.e., the defendant is in a position to mitigate the<br />
sentence by complying with the court’s order. In contrast, criminal contempt<br />
sanctions are punitive. They vindicate the court’s authority and cannot be ended by<br />
any act of the contemnor.<br />
only civil contempt orders issued before a final judgment in the main action are<br />
interlocutory [and thus not appealable].<br />
For appeal purposes, we hold that the distinction between criminal and civil<br />
contempt sanctions has no relevance to whether a party may appeal from a final<br />
order in a supplemental postjudgment contempt proceeding.<br />
We now overrule any cases that could be interpreted as holding that a final civil<br />
contempt order from a postjudgment proceeding is nonappealable and may only be<br />
attacked through a habeas corpus proceeding.<br />
a party to a final marital dissolution decree cannot ask a court to interpret the<br />
decree other than through a modification or a contempt pro blige<br />
in some circumstances, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-358(3) (Reissue 2008) permits a<br />
rebuttable presumption of contempt if a prima facie showing is made that an obligor<br />
is delinquent in his or her child or spousal support obligations.<br />
Because a conditional commitment is a possible sanction in a civil contempt<br />
proceeding, we conclude that the “clear and convincing” standard of proof is the<br />
most appropriate standard.<br />
we overrule all the cases listed in footnote 129 to the extent that these cases hold or<br />
imply that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for civil contempt<br />
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