Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska

For a court to modify child support, the material change of circumstances must exist
at the time of the modification trial.
Temporary unemployment is not a material change of circumstances.
Davis v. Davis, 275 Neb 944, 750 N.W.2d 696 (2008)
Facts: Post divorce, CP filed motion to force ex-husband to submit to a physical exam for
purposes of CP obtaining a life insurance policy on NCP’s life, to ensure future child
support/spousal support would be paid in event of NCPs death. Ex objected. Held: CP’s
motion must fail as against public policy
CP has an insurable interest in the NCP’s life. But an insurable interest does not
give her the right to own a policy on Henry’s life without his consent. Section 44-704
specifically requires adult insureds to consent to insurance policies on their lives
unless they or their spouses are the owners of the policies.
Citing Hopkins v. Hopkins, 328 Md. 263, 614 A.2d 96 (1992): the consent
requirement serves two purposes: (1) It prevents wagering on human lives and (2) it
protects human lives by removing the temptations and risks associated with other
persons’ having an interest in both the insured’s life and death. “Policies issued in
violation of this rule ‘are not dangerous because they are illegal: they are illegal
because they are dangerous.’”
Deterding v. Deterding, 18 Neb. App. 922, 797 N.W.2d 33 (April 2011)
Facts: During marriage, mom conceives child through artificial insemination. Child is not
biologically related to the husband. Upon divorce 5 years after the child’s birth, the trial court
does not order husband to pay child support because child is not biologically related to him.
Mother apparently consents to this arrangement. Other issues were appealed and the Court of
Appeals comes down hard on everyone for the lack of a child support order.
[W]e conclude that the district court committed plain error in failing to award child
support on behalf of the minor child without receiving any evidence concerning the
circumstances surrounding the child’s birth or the child’s relationship with [the
husband] prior to the dissolution proceedings.
Parties in a proceeding to dissolve a marriage cannot control the disposition of
matters pertaining to minor children by agreement. Weinand v. Weinand, 260 Neb.
146, 616 N.W.2d 1 (2000).
[W]e recognize that because the child was conceived through artificial insemination,
this is not a situation where the child has a readily identifiable biological father who is
responsible for her care and support.
If [the husband] consented to [the wife’s] being artificially inseminated, he made a
decision to bring a child into the world, and he should not be permitted to abandon
his responsibility to that child simply because he is not the biological father. Both the
Legislature and the Nebraska Supreme Court have recognized that there are
situations where a person who is not a biological parent may still have a
responsibility to support a child.
The Nebraska dissolution statutes do not impose a duty upon any individual other
than a parent to pay for the support of minor children. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364
(Supp. 2009). However, the term “parent” is not specifically defined in the statutes.
See Weinand v. Weinand, supra. Assuming, without deciding, that Buckley would
not be considered a “parent” pursuant to § 42-364, he still may be responsible for
supporting the child if he has assumed, in loco parentis, the obligations incident to a
parental relationship. See Weinand v. Weinand, supra.
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