Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
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If applicable, earning capacity may be considered in lieu of a parent’s actual,<br />
present income and may include factors such as work history, education,<br />
occupational skills, and job opportunities.<br />
<strong>Child</strong> support may be based on a parent’s earning capacity when a parent voluntarily<br />
leaves employment and a reduction in that parent’s support obligation would<br />
seriously impair the needs of the children<br />
Earning capacity may be used as a basis for an initial determination of child support<br />
under the <strong>Nebraska</strong> <strong>Child</strong> <strong>Support</strong> Guidelines where evidence is presented that the<br />
parent is capable of realizing such capacity through reasonable effort.<br />
Collins v. Collins, 19 Neb. App. 529, 808 N.W.2d 905 (Feb. 2012)<br />
Under the <strong>Nebraska</strong> <strong>Child</strong> <strong>Support</strong> Guidelines, if applicable, earning capacity may be<br />
considered in lieu of a parent's actual, present income and may include factors such<br />
as work history, education, occupational skills, and job opportunities.<br />
In the initial determination of child support, earning capacity may be used where<br />
evidence is presented that the parent is capable of realizing such capacity through<br />
reasonable effort.<br />
The party seeking the modification has the burden to produce sufficient proof that a<br />
material change of circumstances has occurred that warrants a modification.<br />
For a court to modify child support, the material change of circumstances must exist<br />
at the time of the modification trial.<br />
Temporary unemployment is not a material change of circumstances.<br />
Crawford v. Crawford, 263 Neb. 37, 263 Neb. 37 (2002)<br />
Modification of a dissolution decree and the amount of child support are matters<br />
entrusted to the trial court’s discretion, and although the issue on appeal is reviewed<br />
de novo on the record, the decision of the trial court will be affirmed absent an<br />
abuse of discretion<br />
The party requesting a deviation from the <strong>Nebraska</strong> <strong>Child</strong> <strong>Support</strong> Guidelines<br />
based upon an obligation to support offspring of a subsequent relationship bears<br />
the burden of providing evidence regarding the obligation, including the income of<br />
the other parent of the child or children of the subsequent relationship<br />
In considering whether to deviate from the <strong>Nebraska</strong> <strong>Child</strong> <strong>Support</strong> Guidelines<br />
based on an order of support for a subsequent child, the trial court must have<br />
before it the calculations and any worksheets used to determine the child support<br />
order for the subsequent child.<br />
Double Dipping – If (the obligor in a modification action) was able to use his original<br />
support obligation to decrease the amount of his subsequent support obligation to<br />
(his later born child), it would be inequitable to allow him to turn around and use that<br />
subsequent award as the basis for decreasing the original obligation. It would not be<br />
in the best interests of the children to permit (the obligor) to effectively “play one<br />
family against the other” in order to decrease his child support obligation to both.<br />
Erica J. v. Dewitt, 265 Neb. 728, 659 N.W.2d 315 (2003)<br />
Facts: District court modified child support, but did not do so retro to the date of the filing of the<br />
complaint to modify. State appealed, arguing that the court should have back dated the upward<br />
modification. Held: District court acted within its discretion in not back dating modification.<br />
[T]he delays (in bringing the modification action to trial) do not appear to be the fault<br />
of any one individual. We conclude that the district court’s determination to make the<br />
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