The origins of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder a

48 JOHN S. AUERBACH
viewed, the developmental findings that challenge these notions will
be discussed. Because this research is presented thoroughly by, among
others, Beebe and Lachmann (1988), Eagle (1984), Horner (1985), Lachmann
and Beebe (1989), Lichtenberg (1983), D. K. Silverman (1986),
and of course Stern (1985), this discussion will focus on material relevant
to a critique of narcissism. Finally, a reformulation of narcissism
and narcissistic personality disorder consistent with research in developmental
psychology and social cognition will be presented. This
reformulation will build on the pioneering efforts of Broucek (1979,
1982), Fast (1985), and Westen (1990a) to recast narcissism in a manner
consistent with the findings of empirical psychology, Rejecting as empirically
inaccurate most psychoanalytic thinking about the first year
of life, it will emphasize the concordance of psychoanalytic accounts
of the second year (e.g., the anal stage, rapprochement, transitional
object usage, and the mirror phase) with the research literat~re.~ An
additional aspect of this reformulation will be a reconceptualization
and a possible resolution of the Kernberg-Kohut debate.
Primary Narcissism
Assumptions of Psychoanalytic Developmental Theory
At the risk of oversimplification, one might argue that, for Freud, three
dimensions characterize infancy: (a) lack of investment in objects
(Freud, 1915/1957, 1923/1961, 1940/1964); (b) undifferentiation from
or lack of awareness of objects (Freud, 1911/1958a, 1940/1964); and
While I was completing the final revisions of this chapter, I came across
Brouceks (1991) most recent statement on narcissism. He reaches the same
conclusion that I present here in reformulating this concept-specifically, that
narcissism is a consequence of the capacity for self-reflexive awareness, an
ability that emerges in the second year of life. Because I did not become aware
of Broucek’s most recent ideas until very late in the process of preparing this
manuscript, I have not revised the chapter to include them. Even without such
revisions, readers will easily note the influence of Broucek’s work on my thinking.
His ideas, and those of other writers interested in the problems of selfreflexivity,
egocentrism, and narcissism (e.g., Bach, 1985; Blatt, 1983; Westen,
1990a), are central to the argument presented in this paper.