The origins of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder a

THE ORIGINS OF NARCISSISM 89
world of separateness and division, of ambiguity and uncertainty, and
of conflict, loss, and death. Narcissistic illusions exist because life would
be intolerable without them. Thus, the Greek word narke, meaning
stupor or numbness, is the root of both narcotic and Narcissus (Spotnitz
& Resnikoff, 1954). On the other hand, as this etymological relationship
suggests, the narcissistic resolution to the problem of separateness,
even if endemic in human affairs, remains problematic. The myth of
Narcissus is a cautionary tale; it tells us that the price of self-absorption
and self-inflation-in essence, of vanity-is death. More immediately,
clinical considerations tell us that narcissistic personality disorder is
still pathological and that even normal narcissism still involves an
overvaluation of the self at the expense of others (or, in Asian cultures,
the reverse).
Naturally, therefore, one wonders whether a nonnarcissistic resolution
to the dilemmas of separateness is possible. If, by nonnarcissistic
resolution, one means a state in which narcissism no longer exists, then
such a condition is highly improbable. Narcissism is an attempt to
eliminate the tension of division within the self and from others
through the pursuit either of an illusory merger with the totality or of
an illusory omnipotence. On the theory articulated here, even mysticism,
which attempts to repair division and separateness by annulling
the ego and evoking the oceanic feeling, is essentially narcissistic.
Nevertheless, an alternative resolution-one that preserves but also
attempts to transcend narcissistic tensions-is at least conceivable. This
resolution, one of intersubjectivity (Benjamin, 1990; cf. Stern, 1985;
Winnicott, 1971/1982), has its roots in the ideas of Hegel (1807/1977).
Hegel (1807/1977), in describing the development of self-consciousness,
delineated a conflict between the ego’s desire for absolute independence
and its need for recognition. He discussed this conflict as
a dialectic between master and slave. In its longing for omnipotence
and its hostility to that which differs from itself, the ego, as construed
by both psychology and philosophy, is essentially narcissistic (Benjamin,
1990; Buber, 1923/1970; Freud, 1911/1958a; 1915/1957; Horkheimer,
1947/1974; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1972: Kirshner,
1991; Lacan, 1948/1977; 1949/1977; Sartre, 1943/1956). But as Benjamin
(1990, p. 39; cf. Muller, 1985), commenting on the master-slave
dialectic, writes, ”The need for recognition entails this fundamental
paradox: In the very moment of realizing our own independent will,
we are dependent on another to recognize it.” In other words, persons
are independent selves only to the extent that they renounce illusory