The origins of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder a

76 JOHN S. AUERBACH
others is represented (Auerbach, 1990). In this regard, egocentrism,
defined as the inability to shift from one’s own perspective to the
viewpoint of the other and thus to regard oneself as an object (Piaget,
1923/1951, 1924/1952, 1926/1960), clearly involves a disturbance in
the representation of self, especially when this cognitive limitation is
manifested in a manner inappropriate for a person’s age or presumed
level of cognitive organization. It is therefore noteworthy that the two
most prominent theories of narcissism, those of Kohut (1977, 1984)
and Kernberg (1975, 1984), despite their many differences, regard narcissistic
personality disorders as involving disturbances in the representation
of self and others, not just disruptions of self-esteem regulation.
Kernberg argues that narcissistic personality disorder involves
a pathological fusion of real self, ideal self, and ideal object. Not a
misallocation of libido, but a pathological self-formation, with its concomitant
distortions of object representation, is the essential feature of
Kernberg’s understanding of narcissistic disturbance. As for Kohut, his
emphases on selfobjects and self-experience indicate that the fundamental
problem in pathological narcissism is the manner in which one
experiences oneself and one’s ties to sustaining figures and that disturbances
in self-esteem follow from disruptions of the matrix of selfobject
ties. But if distortions of self- (and object) representation are the
essential feature of narcissistic personality disorder, the specific nature
of those distortions also must be delineated.
Self-Reflexivity
Returning, then, from the realm of pathology to that of normality, let
us consider that the self-representation is unique among the constituents
of the representational world. What distinguishes the self-representation
from representations of objects is self-reflexivity (Mann,
1991; Mead, 1934). In his classical account of the self, James (1890/
1958; cf. Mead, 1934; Schafer, 1968) distinguished between the I (the
self as knower or agent, as subject) and the me (the self as known, as
object). Whereas one knows, and relates to, objects only through what
one can observe and infer about them, the situation with self is far
different. Self-knowledge, in contrast to knowledge of others, involves
(at least) two sources (Bach, 1985; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; M. Lewis
& Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1924/1952, 1926/1960,
1937/1954): (a) subjective self-awareness, or the experience of oneself