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The origins of narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder a

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THE ORIGINS OF NARCISSISM 45<br />

the same phenomena according to their preferred theoretical constructs;<br />

(b) sampling bias, with Kernberg having treated more disturbed narcissists<br />

<strong>and</strong> Kohut having treated healthier individuals; <strong>and</strong> (c) interview<br />

bias resulting from differences between Kernberg’s confrontational<br />

stance <strong>and</strong> Kohut’s more empathic approach. Of these, the firstparadigm<br />

clash-is by far the most important.<br />

Because sampling <strong>and</strong> interview biases follow from paradigmatic<br />

assumptions, thoughtful research technique <strong>and</strong> design can control for<br />

the last two factors only to some extent. <strong>The</strong> belief that complex theoretical<br />

controversies can be resolved simply by appeals to supposedly<br />

objective data, as if data could be collected independent <strong>of</strong> the means<br />

<strong>of</strong> observation used <strong>and</strong> the research questions asked, or as if scientific<br />

knowledge could exist without some process <strong>of</strong> interpretation, is untenable<br />

(e.g., Grunbaum, 1984; Lakatos, 1970; Manicas & Secord, 1983;<br />

Putnam, 1990). Contrary to the arguments <strong>of</strong> several highly sophisticated<br />

thinkers in the tradition <strong>of</strong> Dilthey (e.g., Habermas, 1968/1971;<br />

Ricoeur, 1970; Schafer, 1976), the well-intentioned attempt to rescue<br />

the social sciences from positivism <strong>and</strong> reductionism by characterizing<br />

them as sciences <strong>of</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing or interpretation, rather than <strong>of</strong><br />

explanation, fails because it inaccurately characterizes natural sciences<br />

as objective or noninterpretative. Instead <strong>of</strong> permitting less rigorous<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>of</strong> evidence in fields like psychoanalysis or psychology, a<br />

more cogent view therefore rejects positivism as an inadequate epistemology<br />

not only for the social sciences but for the natural sciences<br />

as well. Because all scientific knowledge is to some extent interpretative,<br />

the claim that psychoanalysis is only a hermeneutic <strong>and</strong> not also an<br />

empirical discipline really amounts to a rejection <strong>of</strong> the means by which<br />

scientists attempt to contain the influence <strong>of</strong> their interpretative biases.<br />

Reports <strong>and</strong> paraphrases <strong>of</strong> patient communications are just as dependent<br />

upon the investigator’s theoretical presuppositions as are the<br />

data <strong>of</strong> empirical studies but usually are gathered without observational<br />

controls <strong>and</strong> without the possibility for public critique, revision, or<br />

replication <strong>of</strong> findings.<br />

A lack <strong>of</strong> investigative controls is one reason, among others, that<br />

Grunbaum (1984) has argued that the validation <strong>of</strong> psychoanalytic<br />

theories requires extraclinical studies. Although transcripts <strong>of</strong> psychotherapeutic<br />

<strong>and</strong> psychoanalytic sessions likely also constitute adequate<br />

data sources for testing psychoanalytic hypotheses (Edelson, 1984; Luborsky<br />

& Spence, 1978), the continued appeal to uncontrolled case

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