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<strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> & <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>:<br />

<strong>Interaction</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>regulation</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>research</strong> doma<strong>in</strong>s<br />

Wolfgang Ballwieser<br />

Munich University<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 1


Contents<br />

• Research doma<strong>in</strong>: Theories<br />

• <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories<br />

• <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories<br />

• <strong>Interaction</strong><br />

• Deficits <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 2


Theories 1<br />

• Theories are systems of sentences<br />

about subjects of scientific <strong>in</strong>terest<br />

which<br />

– conta<strong>in</strong> no contradictions<br />

– can be proven false on logical <strong>and</strong>/or<br />

empirical level<br />

– have some k<strong>in</strong>d of generality<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 3


Theories 2<br />

• Theories can be<br />

– normative <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense of prescriptive: if<br />

your aim is x <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> conditions are y, <strong>the</strong>n<br />

you reach your aim by do<strong>in</strong>g z<br />

– positive <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense of expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g or<br />

reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g some aspects of reality<br />

– analytical <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense of us<strong>in</strong>g logic <strong>and</strong><br />

giv<strong>in</strong>g def<strong>in</strong>itions<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 4


<strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ancial account<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>the</strong>ories<br />

Management<br />

account<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ories<br />

normative<br />

positive<br />

<strong>in</strong>come<br />

measurement<br />

<strong>regulation</strong><br />

<strong>regulation</strong><br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />

report<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Beaver/Demski<br />

1979: The nature<br />

of <strong>in</strong>come<br />

measurement<br />

Lev 1988: Theory of<br />

Equitable <strong>and</strong> Efficient<br />

<strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> Policy<br />

Watts/Zimmerman<br />

1986: PAT<br />

Beaver 1998: FR:<br />

An <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong><br />

Revolution<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 5


Normative <strong>regulation</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory 1<br />

• Regulatory aims are<br />

– improv<strong>in</strong>g allocational efficiency<br />

– guarantee<strong>in</strong>g fairness for <strong>in</strong>vestors, protect<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>the</strong>m aga<strong>in</strong>st fraud <strong>and</strong> exploitation (SEC)<br />

– guarantee<strong>in</strong>g equality of opportunity (Lev)<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 6


Normative <strong>regulation</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory 2<br />

• Regulation avoids market failure<br />

• Unregulated f<strong>in</strong>ancial report<strong>in</strong>g leads to<br />

– free rider problem <strong>and</strong> under<strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong><br />

report<strong>in</strong>g (public good argument)<br />

– low network effects <strong>and</strong> high transaction<br />

costs<br />

– <strong>in</strong>formation asymmetry <strong>and</strong> absta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g from<br />

market transactions<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 7


Normative <strong>regulation</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory 3<br />

• Regulation supports network effects<br />

because of<br />

– <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g returns for accumulated <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

– learn<strong>in</strong>g effects<br />

– comparability of f<strong>in</strong>ancial statements<br />

– economies of scale<br />

– large <strong>and</strong> cheap supply of complementary<br />

goods, e.g. audit<strong>in</strong>g services & techniques<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 8


Normative <strong>regulation</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory 4<br />

• FASB/IASB/GASB ... follow <strong>the</strong> concept of<br />

decision usefulness for unidentified users<br />

• It is <strong>the</strong>oretically not clear what this means<br />

(Demski 1973)<br />

• It is practically not clear; th<strong>in</strong>k of<br />

– segmental report<strong>in</strong>g (SFAS 131, IAS 14, GAS 3)<br />

– goodwill amortization (history of SFAS 141&142!)<br />

– consolidation of special purpose entities<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 9


<strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories<br />

Theories on audit<strong>in</strong>g<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial report<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Internal control<br />

<strong>the</strong>ories<br />

normative<br />

positive<br />

audit<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>regulation</strong><br />

<strong>regulation</strong><br />

audit<strong>in</strong>g &<br />

audit<strong>in</strong>g firms<br />

Sampl<strong>in</strong>g<br />

approach<br />

System approach<br />

Risk approach<br />

Quality approach<br />

Corporate<br />

Governance<br />

Independency<br />

Influence of peer<br />

review<br />

Independency<br />

Qualified op<strong>in</strong>ions<br />

Auditor change<br />

Risk analysis<br />

Concentration<br />

process<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 10


Normative <strong>regulation</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory 1<br />

• Regulatory aims are<br />

– enforcement of account<strong>in</strong>g rules<br />

– improv<strong>in</strong>g allocational efficiency<br />

– guarantee<strong>in</strong>g fairness for <strong>in</strong>vestors (SEC)<br />

– guarantee<strong>in</strong>g equality of opportunity (Lev)<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 11


Normative <strong>regulation</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory 2<br />

• Regulation avoids market failure<br />

• Same arguments as above<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 12


<strong>Interaction</strong> 1<br />

• <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> audit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>regulation</strong><br />

must be comb<strong>in</strong>ed because audit<strong>in</strong>g shall<br />

enforce accout<strong>in</strong>g rules<br />

– <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> rules have to be auditable: what<br />

about fair value measurement or impairment<br />

test of good will?<br />

– <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> techniques must be problem solv<strong>in</strong>g<br />

(effective) <strong>and</strong> efficient<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 13


<strong>Interaction</strong> 2<br />

• The auditor creats a new agency<br />

problem (risk of moral hazard <strong>and</strong><br />

collusion); <strong>the</strong>refore<br />

– <strong>the</strong> enforcement of account<strong>in</strong>g rules by<br />

auditors has to be supervised<br />

– <strong>in</strong>centives have to be given <strong>in</strong> order to support<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence of auditors, e.g. by liability<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 14


<strong>Interaction</strong> 3<br />

• Experience shows that audit <strong>regulation</strong><br />

reacts on damages <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> account<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>and</strong>/or audit<strong>in</strong>g sector<br />

• Audit <strong>regulation</strong> should be pro-active<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 15


Deficits <strong>in</strong> Theory 1<br />

• Empirical <strong>research</strong> <strong>in</strong> audit<strong>in</strong>g has many<br />

objections:<br />

– What is <strong>the</strong> governance structure <strong>in</strong> audit<br />

firms? What is <strong>the</strong> role of committees?<br />

– How competitive is <strong>the</strong> audit market?<br />

– What signals quality to whom: client, <strong>in</strong>vestor,<br />

regulatory body?<br />

– What are <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional devices to support<br />

auditor <strong>in</strong>dependence? Public commission /<br />

peer review?<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 16


Deficits <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory 2<br />

• Theoretical <strong>research</strong> has many open<br />

questions:<br />

– How can efficient audit tools be developed <strong>in</strong> a<br />

dynamic world of account<strong>in</strong>g?<br />

– What are <strong>the</strong> consequences of a separation of<br />

audit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> consult<strong>in</strong>g, e.g. with respect to<br />

recruit<strong>in</strong>g good personell <strong>and</strong> risk assessment<br />

of audit clients?<br />

– What are <strong>the</strong> consequences of <strong>the</strong> globalization<br />

of audit firms on management <strong>and</strong> risk?<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 17


Deficits <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory 3<br />

• Recommendations on policy are<br />

restricted by <strong>the</strong> mentioned deficits :<br />

– What k<strong>in</strong>d of recommendations can be given<br />

with respect to regulatory aims, bodies,<br />

<strong>in</strong>stitutions, supervisions etc. <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of<br />

fur<strong>the</strong>r globalization of account<strong>in</strong>g rules?<br />

– What shall be tought at universities <strong>and</strong><br />

colleges <strong>in</strong> order to prepare students for <strong>the</strong><br />

audit<strong>in</strong>g sector?<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 18


Literature<br />

• Ballwieser, Wolfgang, Entwicklung der Theorie der Rechnungslegung <strong>in</strong> den USA, <strong>in</strong>:<br />

Wagner, Franz W. (ed.), Ökonomische Analyse des Bilanzrechts, Sonderheft 32/93<br />

der zfbf, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt a.M. 1993, pp. 107-108.<br />

• Beaver, William H., F<strong>in</strong>ancial Report<strong>in</strong>g: An <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> Revolution. 3. ed., Upper<br />

Saddle River 1998.<br />

• Beaver, William H./Demski, Joel S., The Nature of Income Measurement, AR 54<br />

(1979), pp. 38-46.<br />

• Demski, Joel S., The General Impossibility of Normative <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ards, AR 48<br />

(1973), pp. 718-723.<br />

• Lev, Baruch, Towards a Theory of Equitable <strong>and</strong> Efficient <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> Policy, AR 63<br />

(1988), pp. 1-22.<br />

• Währisch, Mark, The Evolution of International <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> Systems, Frankfurt a.M.<br />

(Peter Lang), 2001.<br />

• Watts, Ross L./Zimmerman, Jerold L., Positive <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> Theory. Englewood Cliffs,<br />

N.J. 1986.<br />

W. Ballwieser: <strong>Account<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> 19

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