Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-82- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre 7.3 shows how the average long-run cost savings from a cadre augmented force vary with cadre mobilization delay. 93 Figure 7.3—Sensitivity of Average Long-Run Cadre Cost Savings from CadreMix Force to Cadre Mobilization Delay $15 CadreMix Cost Savings (Billions) $10 $5 $0 -$5 Cadre (Strict) Cadre (20+) Cadre (16+) Cadre (12+) -$10 12 24 36 48 60 Cadre Mobilization Delay (Months) The cost savings from a cadre augmented force decrease as the cadre mobilization delay increases. When AC units are allowed to deploy with as little as 12 months at home, a cadre augmented force always reduces costs even if the first cadre unit is not mobilized until 60 months after the beginning of the war. However, the average long-run cost savings decrease from $11 billion (36 month delay) to about $1 billion (60 month delay). When cadre units can only deploy with 16 and 20 months at home, a cadre augmented force begins to increase costs when the mobilization delay is longer than 24 months. When AC units must strictly adhere to rotation guidance, a cadre augmented force only reduces costs if the mobilization delay is 12 months or less. Assumptions about mobilization delay have a significant impact on the attractiveness of a cadre augmented force. Assuming that the DoD is willing to allow AC units to deploy ____________ 93 Peacetime cost savings follow the same trend but are slightly larger at all points.
-83- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre with as little as 12 months at home while cadre units mobilize, a cadre augmented force still provides cost savings measured in the billions of dollars even if cadre mobilization is delayed as long as five years, though the savings are significantly smaller. 7.1.2—Mobilization Rate Thus far, we have assumed that after an initial mobilization delay, three cadre BCTs would be ready to deploy every year thereafter. We chose this mobilization rate because it was the highest rate that appeared feasible if cadre units were filled out by increasing endstrength and activating the IRR in wartime. 94 The 2007 force expansion of six BCTs was expected to take four years, 95 a rate of 1.5 BCTs per year. The mobilization rate for cadre units would likely be significantly faster than that of new units given that they already have leadership and some equipment in place and would only need to recruit and train the remainder of the unit. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume a rate double that of creating new units: three BCTs per year (one per trimester). However, it is possible that cadre units could mobilize either more or less rapidly. 96 In this subsection, we hold constant the mobilization delay and vary the rate at which cadre units are ready to deploy. To explore the sensitivity of the results in Chapter Two to mobilization rate, we use the Long War Assignment Model (LWAM) to calculate the number of RC BCTs required under different assumptions about cadre mobilization rates and the DoD’s willingness to stress the AC. Figure 7.4 shows how the number of RC units needed in the force varies with the cadre mobilization rate and the DoD’s willingness to stress the AC. ____________ 94 See Paper II for a discussion of issues related to wartime recruiting and IRR activation. 95 As of September 2007, the Army planned to accelerate the rate of expansion of six BCTs from five years to four years. [Cloud (2007)] 96 The mobilization rate will depend on the structure of a cadre unit and the method chosen to fill out cadre units. See Paper II for more detail.
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-82- A Budgetary Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
7.3 shows how the average long-run cost savings from a cadre augmented force vary with<br />
cadre mobilization delay. 93<br />
Figure 7.3—Sensitivity of Average Long-Run <strong>Cadre</strong> Cost Savings from <strong>Cadre</strong>Mix<br />
Force to <strong>Cadre</strong> Mobilization Delay<br />
$15<br />
<strong>Cadre</strong>Mix Cost Savings (Billions)<br />
$10<br />
$5<br />
$0<br />
-$5<br />
<strong>Cadre</strong> (Strict)<br />
<strong>Cadre</strong> (20+)<br />
<strong>Cadre</strong> (16+)<br />
<strong>Cadre</strong> (12+)<br />
-$10<br />
12 24 36 48 60<br />
<strong>Cadre</strong> Mobilization Delay (Months)<br />
The cost savings from a cadre augmented force decrease as the cadre mobilization<br />
delay increases. When AC units are allowed to deploy with as little as 12 months at home, a<br />
cadre augmented force always reduces costs even if the first cadre unit is not mobilized until<br />
60 months after the beginning of the war. However, the average long-run cost savings<br />
decrease from $11 billion (36 month delay) to about $1 billion (60 month delay). When cadre<br />
units can only deploy with 16 and 20 months at home, a cadre augmented force begins to<br />
increase costs when the mobilization delay is longer than 24 months. When AC units must<br />
strictly adhere to rotation guidance, a cadre augmented force only reduces costs if the<br />
mobilization delay is 12 months or less.<br />
Assumptions about mobilization delay have a significant impact on the attractiveness<br />
of a cadre augmented force. Assuming that the DoD is willing to allow AC units to deploy<br />
____________<br />
93 Peacetime cost savings follow the same trend but are slightly larger at all points.