Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-38- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre increase of six BCTs will not be complete until 2011. 25 If operations in Iraq and Afghanistan last through 2011, then creating AC BCTs will achieve this goal. However, if a significant drawdown of deployed forces begins before 2011, most of these new units will be too late. 26 In this case, these new forces would serve as a rotation base for future wars. 27 In this case, the DoD might consider building new cadre units rather than AC units. Even if this is not the case, when a drawdown does begin, it is worth considering transforming these additional AC units to cadre units. The first subsection explores this possibility. Some policy experts argue that the size of the AC force should be expanded beyond six BCTs. 28 These proposals focus primarily on building a larger rotation base. Therefore, it is also worth considering whether creating these new units as cadre units could reduce annual costs. The second subsection analyzes this possibility. 2.1.1—Rethinking the 2007 Expansion After the increase in the size of the active force is completed in 2011, the Army will have six additional AC BCTs. This force, which we call the 2011 force, will contain 48 AC BCTs and 28 RC BCTs. When these new units are used according to the rotation guidance ____________ 25 Initially, the increase was supposed to occur over five years ending in 2012. As of late-2007, the increase was planned to be completed by the end of 2011, one year earlier. [Cloud (2007)] 26 Many observers doubt that there will remain as substantial a presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan by the time these new units are ready to deploy. Betts (2007) writes: “Had the additional forces been available earlier, to be fielded as needed, the increases might have made sense. But it will take several years to recruit, train, organize, and deploy additional ground combat brigades, by which time the United States will probably have withdrawn the bulk of its forces from Iraq.” Similarly, the International Institute for Strategic Studies writes: “few officials speak of very large US troop deployments to Iraq even two or three years ahead; and many politicians are calling for a drawdown in Iraq starting next year. Hence the immediate and most publicized rationale for the increase may decline as ground forces grow.” [IISS (2007)] Also see: Bender (2007a), Adams (2007a,b), Conetta (2007a), Friedman (2007), and Arkin (2007). 27 The International Institute for Strategic Studies writes: “the announced intention to expand them [the ground forces] is best seen not as ‘relief’ for forces rotating through Iraq and Afghanistan, but rather as a sensible way of hedging against an uncertain- but very possibly dangerous-future.” [IISS (2007)] Also see: Korb and Bergmann (2007), p. 22. 28 See footnotes in section 2.1.2 for references to these proposals.
-39- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre stated as of 2007, they provide two additional BCTs deployed continuously. To sustain rotations in future wars, this same increase could be achieved by adding the same number of cadre units. 29 We call this force the +6 Cadre force. 30 We calculate two types of cost savings from expanding the force with cadre rather than AC BCTs: average long-run and peacetime costs. The average long-run and peacetime costs of adding six new AC BCTs are the same, about $7 billion per year 31 because AC units have the same cost during peacetime and wartime. 32 If we assume that wars occur 33 percent of the time, increasing the size of the force by six cadre BCTs rather than six AC BCTs reduces average long-run annual costs by about $4 billion. 33 Adding six cadre BCTs instead of six AC BCTs reduces peacetime costs by about $5 billion. Cadre units provide larger cost savings in peacetime because we assume they are equivalent to, and therefore cost the same as, AC units when they are mobilized during wartime. This analysis assumes that combat units and their associated combat support / combat service support units are maintained in cadre status during peacetime. We explore the sensitivity of this result in the following chapters. ____________ 29 This assumes cadre units are used according to the same rotation guidance as AC units when mobilized. Since members of cadre units would be full time soldiers, it is likely that they would be utilized like AC units. 30 The +6 Cadre force contains 42 AC BCTs, 28 RC BCTs and 6 cadre BCTs. 31 This assumes the average annual cost of an active duty soldier is $100,000 per year. This is consistent with the estimates in CBO (2007a). Given this per soldier cost, the 65,000 (six BCT) increase in Army end-strength would cost an additional $7 billion per year. This is slightly lower than the projected sum of personnel and operations cost of the force increase estimated by the Army in 2008 ($8.2 billion). [GAO (2008), p.4] Other public sources have estimated the annual cost of increasing the size of the force at $1.5 billion per 10,000 personnel [New York Times Editorial Board (2006)], and $1.2 billion per 10,000 personnel [Jaffe (2006), and IISS (2007)]. Using these alternative estimates, the magnitude of the cost savings from a cadre augmented force calculated in this paper would be larger. See Appendix A for more detail. 32 AC units are always mobilized, unlike RC units, which are only mobilized for deployments. 33 Calculations are described in Appendix A.
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-39- A Budgetary Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
stated as of 2007, they provide two additional BCTs deployed continuously. To sustain<br />
rotations in future wars, this same increase could be achieved by adding the same number of<br />
cadre units. 29 We call this force the +6 <strong>Cadre</strong> force. 30<br />
We calculate two types of cost savings from expanding the force with cadre rather<br />
than AC BCTs: average long-run and peacetime costs. The average long-run and peacetime<br />
costs of adding six new AC BCTs are the same, about $7 billion per year 31 because AC units<br />
have the same cost during peacetime and wartime. 32 If we assume that wars occur 33 percent<br />
of the time, increasing the size of the force by six cadre BCTs rather than six AC BCTs<br />
reduces average long-run annual costs by about $4 billion. 33 Adding six cadre BCTs instead<br />
of six AC BCTs reduces peacetime costs by about $5 billion. <strong>Cadre</strong> units provide larger cost<br />
savings in peacetime because we assume they are equivalent to, and therefore cost the same<br />
as, AC units when they are mobilized during wartime. This analysis assumes that combat<br />
units and their associated combat support / combat service support units are maintained in<br />
cadre status during peacetime. We explore the sensitivity of this result in the following<br />
chapters.<br />
____________<br />
29 This assumes cadre units are used according to the same rotation guidance as AC units when mobilized.<br />
Since members of cadre units would be full time soldiers, it is likely that they would be utilized like AC units.<br />
30 The +6 <strong>Cadre</strong> force contains 42 AC BCTs, 28 RC BCTs and 6 cadre BCTs.<br />
31 This assumes the average annual cost of an active duty soldier is $100,000 per year. This is consistent with<br />
the estimates in CBO (2007a). Given this per soldier cost, the 65,000 (six BCT) increase in <strong>Army</strong> end-strength<br />
would cost an additional $7 billion per year. This is slightly lower than the projected sum of personnel and<br />
operations cost of the force increase estimated by the <strong>Army</strong> in 2008 ($8.2 billion). [GAO (2008), p.4] Other<br />
public sources have estimated the annual cost of increasing the size of the force at $1.5 billion per 10,000<br />
personnel [New York Times Editorial Board (2006)], and $1.2 billion per 10,000 personnel [Jaffe (2006), and<br />
IISS (2007)]. Using these alternative estimates, the magnitude of the cost savings from a cadre augmented force<br />
calculated in this paper would be larger. See Appendix A for more detail.<br />
32 AC units are always mobilized, unlike RC units, which are only mobilized for deployments.<br />
33 Calculations are described in Appendix A.