Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-28- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre 1.3.1—Frequency of War The difference between wartime and peacetime in the analyses in this paper is the need for “reserve” units (RC, cadre). The frequency of war measures the percentage of time that RC and cadre units are needed. We distinguish here between need and mobilization because RC and cadre units are not mobilized for all years of a war. Cadre units mobilize in wartime following a delay, after which they are mobilized for the remainder of the war. RC units only mobilize one year in six during wartime. Estimating how frequently reserve forces would be needed requires thinking carefully about when RC and cadre units would be mobilized. In this paper, we assume that these units are mobilized only if the requirement for deployed forces surges for a sustained period of time above the level at which the AC can sustain when rotated at 1:2. 11 If the requirement surges only for a short period (less than one year), AC units in the ARFORGEN “ready” pool can surge to meet the requirement without the need to mobilize reserve units. However, if the requirement stays at a higher level beyond one year, RC and cadre units would be needed and mobilized. It is likely that cadre units will be mobilized for some wars in which they are not deployed and that cadre units will not be immediately demobilized at the end of each war. While our baseline frequency of war estimate includes both short and long wars, our analysis does not include costs for demobilization and therefore overestimates the cost savings from a cadre augmented force. 12 ____________ 11 For instance, a force with 48 AC BCTs can sustain 16 deployed BCTs at 1:2. If the requirement for deployed forces surged above 16 BCTs for more than one year then RC and cadre BCTs would be mobilized. 12 Paper II finds that the cost of separation bonuses could reduce the cost savings from a cadre augmented force by 15 percent. The cost savings could be reduced even further if the demobilization process takes many years.
-29- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre We use 33 percent as our baseline estimate for the frequency of wars. This estimate is from Doyle and Gotz (2007) which captures all wars (both long and short) occurring since WWII. Doyle and Gotz estimate a Markov transition matrix for wars occurring since World War II. Although it is impossible to accurately predict the frequency of future wars, this estimate provides an external, historically grounded, estimate that can serve as the base case. Chapter Three examines the sensitivity of the results in this paper to assumptions about the frequency of future wars. 1.3.2—Peacetime Cost For RC units, we use the peacetime cost estimate from Jaffe (2006). This is the most recent publicly available estimate and is based on data provided by the U.S. Army. It is also consistent with our own calculations and a number of previous estimates. 13 The peacetime cost of a cadre unit will depend on the design and organization of the cadre unit. 14 The larger the size of the “cadre” (leaders retained in peacetime), the more expensive the cadre unit will be. A 1992 report from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) discusses this issue: “The results … suggest that the cost to operate cadre units in the Army would vary substantially depending on the design of the cadre unit. A cadre unit with minimal manning—about 4 percent to 5 percent of a normal unit’s total manning—would cost only about 15 percent as much to operate as a corresponding selected reserve unit.” - CBO (1992) ____________ 13 See Section A.2.2 for a full discussion of previous estimates about the relative cost of the RC. 14 See Paper II for a discussion of cadre unit designs and their implications for the peacetime cost of a cadre unit.
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-29- A Budgetary Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />
We use 33 percent as our baseline estimate for the frequency of wars. This estimate<br />
is from Doyle and Gotz (2007) which captures all wars (both long and short) occurring since<br />
WWII. Doyle and Gotz estimate a Markov transition matrix for wars occurring since World<br />
War II. Although it is impossible to accurately predict the frequency of future wars, this<br />
estimate provides an external, historically grounded, estimate that can serve as the base case.<br />
Chapter Three examines the sensitivity of the results in this paper to assumptions about the<br />
frequency of future wars.<br />
1.3.2—Peacetime Cost<br />
For RC units, we use the peacetime cost estimate from Jaffe (2006). This is the most<br />
recent publicly available estimate and is based on data provided by the U.S. <strong>Army</strong>. It is also<br />
consistent with our own calculations and a number of previous estimates. 13 The peacetime<br />
cost of a cadre unit will depend on the design and organization of the cadre unit. 14 The<br />
larger the size of the “cadre” (leaders retained in peacetime), the more expensive the cadre<br />
unit will be. A 1992 report from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) discusses this issue:<br />
“The results … suggest that the cost to operate cadre units in the <strong>Army</strong> would vary<br />
substantially depending on the design of the cadre unit. A cadre unit with minimal<br />
manning—about 4 percent to 5 percent of a normal unit’s total manning—would<br />
cost only about 15 percent as much to operate as a corresponding selected reserve<br />
unit.”<br />
- CBO (1992)<br />
____________<br />
13 See Section A.2.2 for a full discussion of previous estimates about the relative cost of the RC.<br />
14 See Paper II for a discussion of cadre unit designs and their implications for the peacetime cost of a cadre<br />
unit.
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