Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
-378- Conclusion these tradeoffs at a theoretical level. More detailed analysis is needed, especially in regards to the peacetime structure/cost and ability to fill out cadre units in wartime. A cadre augmented force is not the only way to reduce costs when planning for wars fought with rotation. We might also consider paying some reservists to serve in RC units that deploy more frequently than one year in six as suggested in Klerman (2008). Depending on the size of the incentive required, this could achieve cost savings similar to those of a cadre augmented force without facing many of the risks. Other alternatives may also be worth considering. This dissertation is not intended to advocate any single force structure. It is simply intended to analyze one option along a continuum of possible readiness/cost force structure tradeoffs. Increasing personnel costs together with increases in non-discretionary spending will likely require making hard force structure decisions in the future. 1 It is hoped that the reader will take away from this dissertation an appreciation for the differences between planning for wars with and without rotation and that the analyses presented here may provide a framework to consider force structure alternatives for rotation. ____________ 1 In a 2008 interview Secretary of Defense Robert Gages “acknowledged that as manpower costs continue to rise, the U.S. at some point could be faced with a choice between a smaller military or one that is not as wellequipped or cannot range as widely as the current force.” [McMichael (2008)]
-379- Bibliography Bibliography Adams, Gordon, “Bigger force unnecessary,” USA Today, January 21, 2007a. Adams, Gordon, “The Problem with expanding the U.S. military,” The Bulletin Online (www.thebulletin.org), May 1, 2007b. Ambrose, Stephen E., Upton and the Army, Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, LA, 1964. Arkin, William M., “Is a Bigger Army a Better Army?” Washington Post, July 10, 2007. Asch, Beth J, John T. Warner, “An Examination of the Effects of Voluntary Separation Incentives,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND MR-859, 2001. Aspin, Les, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993. Bacevich, Andrew J., “More Troops, more troubles,” Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2007. Bailey, Ronald B., Cadre Army Divisions, Logistics Management Institute, Bethesda, MD, February 1991. Barker, Kim, “Extended Tours break bonds of GI’s families,” Chicago Tribune, May 16, 2007. Barnes, Julian E., “Guard Faces Phase-Out of Combat Role,” Los Angeles Times, May 8, 2006. Barnes, Julian E., “Long tours in Iraq may be minefield for mental health,” Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2007a. Barry, John, “Does America Need a Bigger Military: Stretched thin, the U.S. Military needs to get bigger. But that will require some sacrifice,” Newsweek. May 10, 2007 Bay, Austin. “The bottom line is, U.S. needs a 650,000-troop Army,” Houston Chronicle, May 18, 2007. Bender, Bryan, “Analysts question need for boost in combat troops,” Boston Globe, March 5, 2007a. Bender, Bryan, “Army cuts time spent on training,” Boston Globe, August 19, 2007b. Betts, Rickard K., Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, The Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1995. Betts, Richard K., “A Disciplined Defense: How to Regain Strategic Solvency,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007.
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-378- Conclusion<br />
these tradeoffs at a theoretical level. More detailed analysis is needed, especially in regards to<br />
the peacetime structure/cost and ability to fill out cadre units in wartime.<br />
A cadre augmented force is not the only way to reduce costs when planning for wars<br />
fought with rotation. We might also consider paying some reservists to serve in RC units<br />
that deploy more frequently than one year in six as suggested in Klerman (2008). Depending<br />
on the size of the incentive required, this could achieve cost savings similar to those of a<br />
cadre augmented force without facing many of the risks. Other alternatives may also be<br />
worth considering.<br />
This dissertation is not intended to advocate any single force structure. It is simply<br />
intended to analyze one option along a continuum of possible readiness/cost force structure<br />
tradeoffs. Increasing personnel costs together with increases in non-discretionary spending<br />
will likely require making hard force structure decisions in the future. 1 It is hoped that the<br />
reader will take away from this dissertation an appreciation for the differences between<br />
planning for wars with and without rotation and that the analyses presented here may<br />
provide a framework to consider force structure alternatives for rotation.<br />
____________<br />
1 In a 2008 interview Secretary of Defense Robert Gages “acknowledged that as manpower costs continue to<br />
rise, the U.S. at some point could be faced with a choice between a smaller military or one that is not as wellequipped<br />
or cannot range as widely as the current force.” [McMichael (2008)]
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