Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-377- Conclusion
Conclusion
This dissertation has analyzed a cadre augmented force from three different
perspectives. The introduction asserts that a force limited to AC and RC units maintains
some units at an unnecessarily high level of readiness for ways fought with rotation. The first
paper shows that a cadre augmented force can decrease annual costs by billions of dollars by
increasing military risk. The second paper explores different design options for a cadre
augmented force and identifies the major risks of relying on a cadre augmented force. The
third paper shows that cadre proposals are not new to the U.S. Army and that the cadre
forces analyzed in this dissertation differ from those that have been proposed in the past.
Together, these papers show that a cadre augmented force may be worth considering if the
Department of Defense plans to make force structure decisions driven by rotation.
This dissertation points out a number of risks associated with a cadre augmented
force. The first paper shows that even though a cadre augmented force can reduce annual
costs by billions of dollars, it increases stress on the active force relative to a non-cadre
force. Additionally, we find that a cadre augmented force reduces the number of units ready
to deploy at a moments notice. This is important if the force planning paradigm ever shifts
back to planning for two simultaneous short-warning wars. The second paper shows that a
cadre augmented force comes with other risks such as not having enough junior personnel
available or not activating cadre units early enough during wartime. The third paper shows
that there has been significant opposition to cadre proposals in the past. All of these risks
must be considered carefully and weighed against the substantial cost savings offered by a
cadre augmented force. This dissertation has presented the information needed to consider