Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-371- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
Some previous cadre proposals have also attempted to estimate the cost of a cadre
unit during peacetime. None of the cadre proposals prior to the end of the Cold War
provided cost estimates. However, a number of the post Cold War proposals estimated the
cost of different types of cadre units. These costs, discussed in this paper, are within the
same range as those estimated in this dissertation. 348
Finally, previous cadre proposals provided estimates of cadre readiness. The cadre
forces of Calhoun and Upton were assumed to be ready to deploy in months. The cadre
forces of the post Cold War period were expected to deploy in about a year. These show
that it appears more than reasonable to assume that cadre units could be ready to deploy three
years after the beginning of a war as we did in this dissertation.
10.3—OPPOSITION TO CADRE
Cadre proposals have been rejected many times in the history of the United States.
In many instances, Congress has been the main opponent of these proposals. Congressional
opposition may remain an issue for the cadre forces proposed in this dissertation. Replacing
active duty or reserve units with cadre units would affect the districts of a number of
Congressmen. These representatives are likely to lobby aggressively against the unproven
cadre augmented force. Congressional opposition has often defeated cadre proposals in the
past. Therefore, it is important that any cadre proposal be as clear as possible about the
underlying assumptions and reasoning. The cadre augmented force proposed in this
dissertation can either reduce the cost of national defense or provide additional defense
capability at the same cost when planning for long rotational wars. Emphasizing this
____________
348 See Paper II for a full discussion of the peacetime cost of a cadre unit and its relationship to cadre structure
and organization.