Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

rand.org
07.06.2014 Views

-362- A Historical Analysis of Cadre In their report, the CBO also discussed the drawbacks to the cadre forces examined. First, CBO questioned the readiness of cadre units. CBO questioned Army estimates that cadre units could be ready for combat in Europe in 12 to 15 months. CBO commented that this estimate may not be reliable and that “a new estimate of the time required to ready cadre units for combat might be much longer than a year” because it depends on the peacetime manning level of the unit. 332 Second, CBO was concerned with morale and asked: “would active officers assigned to some of these units … view the assignments so unfavorably that morale would plummet.” 333 The validity of this concern depends on the peacetime duties of the cadre as discussed in Paper II of this dissertation. This report was the last time that cadre units were seriously considered by military analysts. Cadre faded from policy discussions as the new administration came to control the policy debate. 9.9—CADRE DISSAPPEARS AGAIN Following the 1992 report from CBO, cadre forces were rarely mentioned in public military policy discussions. There are two reasons for this. First, as early as 1991, planning for reconstitution had been generally ignored as planners focused more on AC and RC forces since they would be the first to deploy. Second, the Clinton administration came into office in 1992 and began their own force structure review called the Bottom-Up Review, which ignored cadre forces completely. This was due to the vanishing threat of a resurgent ____________ 332 CBO commented that “It is unclear what kind of cadre unit the Army assumed in developing” their estimate for readiness. [CBO (1992), p. 34]. In the Army’s letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee, they wrote: “Cadre divisions could be formed in either the reserve components or active component … However, we believe that availability for deployment is dependent upon the time it takes to fill and train the unit and not the component. This is very much an open issue and … is one of the key elements to be studied by the Training and Doctrine Command.” [Tice (1991a)] 333 CBO (1992), p. 37

-363- A Historical Analysis of Cadre Russia and the desire to achieve greater cost savings. 334 The lack of priority for cadre units combined with the disregard from the new administration led to the final disappearance of cadre from military policy debates. 9.9.1—Failure to Plan for Reconstitution Even before the Clinton administration came into office, some military analysts had begun to question the commitment of the government to planning for reconstitution. In the fall of 1991, John Brinkerhoff wrote an article in Strategic Review discussing the need for a clear reconstitution policy. 335 Brinkerhoff argued that the country lacked a clear reconstitution plan and that “the outlook for actually putting reconstitution into place is doubtful.” 336 Brinkerhoff’s article shows that reconstitution had begun to fade from being “one of four major pillars of the new national security strategy,” to a secondary concern for defense planners. Brinkerhoff noted that “many defense planners … believe reconstitution is simply too hard to do,” and therefore ignored it. 337 Brinkerhoff was not the only one to question the government’s commitment to reconstitution. In April of 1992, two Army officers at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces published a report looking at the manpower challenges of planning for reconstitution. 338 They concluded that “while reconstitution is a part of the United States’ National Military Strategy, it remains a concept without sufficient definition, funding, or ____________ 334 See discussion in Section 9.9.2 335 Brinkerhoff (1991) 336 Brinkerhoff (1991), p. 20 337 Brinkerhoff (1991), p. 20. Brinkerhoff felt strongly about the need to plan for reconstitution. Brinkerhoff would later serve on a committee at the National Research Council on which he would propose cadre units as a way to “alleviate the problem of overused active and reserve components” for peacekeeping duties. This recommendation is included as a secondary consideration in the appendices of National Research Council (1999). 338 Peterson and Patrick (1992)

-363- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

Russia and the desire to achieve greater cost savings. 334 The lack of priority for cadre units<br />

combined with the disregard from the new administration led to the final disappearance of<br />

cadre from military policy debates.<br />

9.9.1—Failure to Plan for Reconstitution<br />

Even before the Clinton administration came into office, some military analysts had<br />

begun to question the commitment of the government to planning for reconstitution. In the<br />

fall of 1991, John Brinkerhoff wrote an article in Strategic Review discussing the need for a<br />

clear reconstitution policy. 335 Brinkerhoff argued that the country lacked a clear<br />

reconstitution plan and that “the outlook for actually putting reconstitution into place is<br />

doubtful.” 336 Brinkerhoff’s article shows that reconstitution had begun to fade from being<br />

“one of four major pillars of the new national security strategy,” to a secondary concern for<br />

defense planners. Brinkerhoff noted that “many defense planners … believe reconstitution is<br />

simply too hard to do,” and therefore ignored it. 337<br />

Brinkerhoff was not the only one to question the government’s commitment to<br />

reconstitution. In April of 1992, two <strong>Army</strong> officers at the Industrial College of the Armed<br />

Forces published a report looking at the manpower challenges of planning for<br />

reconstitution. 338 They concluded that “while reconstitution is a part of the United States’<br />

National Military Strategy, it remains a concept without sufficient definition, funding, or<br />

____________<br />

334 See discussion in Section 9.9.2<br />

335 Brinkerhoff (1991)<br />

336 Brinkerhoff (1991), p. 20<br />

337 Brinkerhoff (1991), p. 20. Brinkerhoff felt strongly about the need to plan for reconstitution. Brinkerhoff<br />

would later serve on a committee at the National Research Council on which he would propose cadre units as a<br />

way to “alleviate the problem of overused active and reserve components” for peacekeeping duties. This<br />

recommendation is included as a secondary consideration in the appendices of National Research Council<br />

(1999).<br />

338 Peterson and Patrick (1992)

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