Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

rand.org
07.06.2014 Views

-360- A Historical Analysis of Cadre Chu in 1989 and could still be useful today. 325 Cadre units could be manned at different levels in peacetime depending on their expected mobilization order. The German cadre system of the early 1990s was much different from that in the Soviet Union. Germany included cadre units as a component of each unit rather than having separate cadre units. The GAO describes: “in Germany, one of each brigade’s five combat battalions is a cadre battalion that, upon mobilization, would be filled using surplus active forces and some reserves.” 326 After testing the cadre concept, Germany found that the cost savings from cadre units were lower than expected. The GAO wrote: “while Germany looked to cadres to save money, its tests show that cost savings may be less than anticipated.” 327 Although this dissertation focuses on cadre BCTs, integrating cadre units into the total force below the BCT level may also be of interest to military planners in the United States. The main recommendations of the GAO report were that the Army should consider implementing cadre units at force levels other than the division and that they test the cadre concept before implementing it. The report also emphasized that it is important to keep in mind the differences between the military system in the U.S. and those of other countries. Although both the Soviet Union and Germany had cadre augmented forces as of 1991, they both relied on conscription. This made issues of “filling” cadre units with new soldiers much ____________ 325 In 1989, David Chu, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation wrote: “Everything is potentially variable in the kind of future we may confront, and there are no particular assumptions that ought to be seen as sacrosanct. This includes some of the classifications used in the defense manpower community itself. Too frequently, we have resorted to rigid, compartmentalized classifications in attempting to categorize personnel. It is common, for instance to say that there are active forces and there are reserve forces … The view that arguably should be taken is that there is actually a continuum of forces, and we should compel ourselves to look at manpower issues in this way, rather than viewing force elements as existing in discrete “compartments” that are sharply differentiated from one another.” [Gotz and Brown (1989), p. 115, emphasis added] 326 GAO (1991), p. 4 327 GAO (1991), p.4

-361- A Historical Analysis of Cadre simpler than it would be for a volunteer military. As far back as Upton, cadre proponents had argued for cadre forces based on the success of similar systems in Europe. However, except for a brief time in American military history, the U.S. has almost exclusively depended on volunteers while most of Europe depended on peacetime conscription. This limits the usefulness of analogies between these cadre systems. 9.8.4—CBO (1992) In September of 1992, a report from CBO discussed cadre forces publicly for one of the final times. 328 The report was similar in nature to CBO (1990) in that it analyzed alternative force structures, two of which included cadre units. The first cadre augmented force analyzed in CBO (1992) included five cadre divisions manned with active duty personnel “at a level of 25 percent of the manning of an Army division.” 329 The second cadre augmented force included eight cadre divisions “manned sparingly, typically at levels equal to only about 5 percent or 10 percent of full manning.” 330 While CBO did not provide much detail about the design of these cadre units, they did estimate their costs. They estimated the annual cost of a cadre division with 25 percent of authorized personnel on active duty to be 70 percent of a RC unit. For a cadre division with five percent of authorized personnel, CBO estimated the annual cost to be 15 percent of a RC unit. 331 These estimates are consistent with those from the LMI report although CBO did not explore as many different cadre unit designs. ____________ 328 CBO (1992) 329 CBO (1992), Summary. This is slightly higher than the 20 percent manning assumed in CBO (1990). 330 CBO (1992), Summary. 331 CBO (1992), p. 31

-360- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

Chu in 1989 and could still be useful today. 325 <strong>Cadre</strong> units could be manned at different<br />

levels in peacetime depending on their expected mobilization order.<br />

The German cadre system of the early 1990s was much different from that in the<br />

Soviet Union. Germany included cadre units as a component of each unit rather than having<br />

separate cadre units. The GAO describes: “in Germany, one of each brigade’s five combat<br />

battalions is a cadre battalion that, upon mobilization, would be filled using surplus active<br />

forces and some reserves.” 326 After testing the cadre concept, Germany found that the cost<br />

savings from cadre units were lower than expected. The GAO wrote: “while Germany<br />

looked to cadres to save money, its tests show that cost savings may be less than<br />

anticipated.” 327 Although this dissertation focuses on cadre BCTs, integrating cadre units<br />

into the total force below the BCT level may also be of interest to military planners in the<br />

United States.<br />

The main recommendations of the GAO report were that the <strong>Army</strong> should consider<br />

implementing cadre units at force levels other than the division and that they test the cadre<br />

concept before implementing it. The report also emphasized that it is important to keep in<br />

mind the differences between the military system in the U.S. and those of other countries.<br />

Although both the Soviet Union and Germany had cadre augmented forces as of 1991, they<br />

both relied on conscription. This made issues of “filling” cadre units with new soldiers much<br />

____________<br />

325 In 1989, David Chu, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation wrote: “Everything<br />

is potentially variable in the kind of future we may confront, and there are no particular assumptions that ought<br />

to be seen as sacrosanct. This includes some of the classifications used in the defense manpower community<br />

itself. Too frequently, we have resorted to rigid, compartmentalized classifications in attempting to categorize<br />

personnel. It is common, for instance to say that there are active forces and there are reserve forces … The<br />

view that arguably should be taken is that there is actually a continuum of forces, and we should compel<br />

ourselves to look at manpower issues in this way, rather than viewing force elements as existing in discrete<br />

“compartments” that are sharply differentiated from one another.” [Gotz and Brown (1989), p. 115, emphasis<br />

added]<br />

326 GAO (1991), p. 4<br />

327 GAO (1991), p.4

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