Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

-353- A Historical Analysis of Cadre
that “although some lessons can be learned from reviewing cadre systems of other nations,
differences in culture, landpower requirements, and military strategy preclude their wholesale
adoption.” 293 The first conclusion is important because it shows that the Army was not
adverse to the cadre concept and thought it was feasible if implemented correctly. The
second conclusion is important because many of the cadre proposals we have discussed in
this paper have been based on the success of cadre systems in foreign nations. These
analogies may not be directly applicable to the U.S. situation.
Based on early drafts of this report, the Army provided the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees with a letter describing their preliminary results in February of 1991. In
a later analysis of cadre forces, CBO wrote that “the letter suggest(ed) that forming some
cadre units may be feasible.” 294 However, CBO was critical of the letter in that it did not
“specify what kinds of personnel should man the cadre units in peacetime,” (active or
reserve) or “how many individuals would be assigned to cadre units in peacetime.” 295 CBO
noted that the letter “suggests that the number assigned could range widely, from as little as
four percent to five percent of full peacetime manning up to 60 percent.” 296 The letter
showed that the specifics of cadre had not been fleshed out as “the Army (was still) in the
process of refining its cadre concept.” 297 The uncertainties surrounding the implementation
of cadre units led Congress to direct “the Army to delay carrying out the cadre concept and
to study it further.” 298
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293 Holcomb (1992), p. 14-16.
294 CBO (1992), p. 27
295 CBO (1992), p. 28
296 CBO (1992), p. 28
297 CBO (1992), p. 28
298 CBO (1992), p. 28