Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

07.06.2014 Views

-338- A Historical Analysis of Cadre have a negative impact on the state of the reserves after the war. Crossland and Currie note that “the Army Reserve ended the 1960’s in disrepair and disarray …. Reservists were characterized as summer soldiers—draft-dodgers in the eyes of some Regulars.” 232 To address the problems with the reserves, the Army adopted the Total Force Policy following the Vietnam War. The Total Force Policy was a “major transformation” where the Army Reserve would be “an essential partner in the Total Army.” 233 The decision to increase reliance on the reserves renewed the debate about cadre units. 8.1—A NEW CADRE DEBATE In June 1972, General William C. Westmoreland wrote that “only Regular Army forces in being can achieve the levels of readiness required.” 234 Crossland and Currie write that Westmoreland recommended that “the Regular Army be considered a cadre that could be expanded rapidly in an emergency.” 235 According to Westmoreland, this Army would “serve as a hedge against the high risk associated with the heavy reliance on the Reserve Components.” 236 This was the first time that a cadre force had been explicitly recommended since the early twentieth century. Crossland and Currie argue that “the expansible army of John C. Calhoun had been rejected in 1916 and 1920 when the Army took firm steps toward ____________ 232 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 211 233 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 212. Prior to the total force policy there had been little integration of active Army and the Army Reserve units. Crossland and Currie describe the situation in 1967: “the Army had not converted the Army Reserve units to the more modern Tables of Organization and Equipment then in the active Army … Active Army and Army Reserve units were no longer compatible. They were not organized and equipped in such a manner as to allow rapid integration into the active Army upon mobilization.” [Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 176] 234 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 216. Westmoreland’s own words in a letter to President Nixon dated June 30, 1972. 235 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 216 236 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 216. Westmoreland’s own words in a letter to President Nixon dated June 30, 1972.

-339- A Historical Analysis of Cadre establishing a federal reserve force as a means of expanding the active establishment, but the cadre concept still seemed to enjoy some popularity.” 237 Westmoreland’s recommendations were for the most part disregarded, but they show that the cadre idea remained in the minds of military professionals. 238 In an August 1972 article in Army magazine, General Hamilton H. Howze proposed what he called a “cadre system” for the reserves. 239 This cadre system was different from those of Calhoun and Upton. Howze proposed that reserve divisions maintain all their parttime personnel but replace their leadership with Regular Army personnel. Rather than arguing for skeletonized units led by Regular Army personnel in replacement of reserve units, Howze proposed integrating Active Component personnel into Reserve Component units to increase the readiness of reserve units. Howze was not alone in making this proposal, Colonel David R. Hampton wrote a similar proposal in 1973. 240 The proposals of Westmoreland, Howze, and Hampton showed that the cadre idea had not disappeared all together. However, these proposals were given little attention by those making military policy at the time. The general acceptance of the Uptonian doctrine that had existed in the War Department in the early 20 th century seemed to have disappeared in the Department of Defense of the 1970s. ____________ 237 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 216 238 It is also likely that Upton’s history of the Army was part of the curriculum when Westmoreland attended West Point from 1932-1936. 239 Howze (1972) 240 Hampton (1973)

-339- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

establishing a federal reserve force as a means of expanding the active establishment, but the<br />

cadre concept still seemed to enjoy some popularity.” 237 Westmoreland’s recommendations<br />

were for the most part disregarded, but they show that the cadre idea remained in the minds<br />

of military professionals. 238<br />

In an August 1972 article in <strong>Army</strong> magazine, General Hamilton H. Howze proposed<br />

what he called a “cadre system” for the reserves. 239 This cadre system was different from<br />

those of Calhoun and Upton. Howze proposed that reserve divisions maintain all their parttime<br />

personnel but replace their leadership with Regular <strong>Army</strong> personnel. Rather than<br />

arguing for skeletonized units led by Regular <strong>Army</strong> personnel in replacement of reserve<br />

units, Howze proposed integrating Active Component personnel into Reserve Component<br />

units to increase the readiness of reserve units. Howze was not alone in making this<br />

proposal, Colonel David R. Hampton wrote a similar proposal in 1973. 240<br />

The proposals of Westmoreland, Howze, and Hampton showed that the cadre idea<br />

had not disappeared all together. However, these proposals were given little attention by<br />

those making military policy at the time. The general acceptance of the Uptonian doctrine<br />

that had existed in the War Department in the early 20 th century seemed to have disappeared<br />

in the Department of Defense of the 1970s.<br />

____________<br />

237 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 216<br />

238 It is also likely that Upton’s history of the <strong>Army</strong> was part of the curriculum when Westmoreland attended<br />

West Point from 1932-1936.<br />

239 Howze (1972)<br />

240 Hampton (1973)

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