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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army - RAND Corporation

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-338- A Historical Analysis of <strong>Cadre</strong><br />

have a negative impact on the state of the reserves after the war. Crossland and Currie note<br />

that “the <strong>Army</strong> Reserve ended the 1960’s in disrepair and disarray …. Reservists were<br />

characterized as summer soldiers—draft-dodgers in the eyes of some Regulars.” 232<br />

To address the problems with the reserves, the <strong>Army</strong> adopted the Total Force Policy<br />

following the Vietnam War. The Total Force Policy was a “major transformation” where the<br />

<strong>Army</strong> Reserve would be “an essential partner in the Total <strong>Army</strong>.” 233 The decision to increase<br />

reliance on the reserves renewed the debate about cadre units.<br />

8.1—A NEW CADRE DEBATE<br />

In June 1972, General William C. Westmoreland wrote that “only Regular <strong>Army</strong><br />

forces in being can achieve the levels of readiness required.” 234 Crossland and Currie write<br />

that Westmoreland recommended that “the Regular <strong>Army</strong> be considered a cadre that could<br />

be expanded rapidly in an emergency.” 235 According to Westmoreland, this <strong>Army</strong> would<br />

“serve as a hedge against the high risk associated with the heavy reliance on the Reserve<br />

Components.” 236 This was the first time that a cadre force had been explicitly recommended<br />

since the early twentieth century. Crossland and Currie argue that “the expansible army of<br />

John C. Calhoun had been rejected in 1916 and 1920 when the <strong>Army</strong> took firm steps toward<br />

____________<br />

232 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 211<br />

233 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 212. Prior to the total force policy there had been little integration of active<br />

<strong>Army</strong> and the <strong>Army</strong> Reserve units. Crossland and Currie describe the situation in 1967: “the <strong>Army</strong> had not<br />

converted the <strong>Army</strong> Reserve units to the more modern Tables of Organization and Equipment then in the<br />

active <strong>Army</strong> … Active <strong>Army</strong> and <strong>Army</strong> Reserve units were no longer compatible. They were not organized and<br />

equipped in such a manner as to allow rapid integration into the active <strong>Army</strong> upon mobilization.” [Crossland<br />

and Currie (1984), p. 176]<br />

234 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 216. Westmoreland’s own words in a letter to President Nixon dated June<br />

30, 1972.<br />

235 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 216<br />

236 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 216. Westmoreland’s own words in a letter to President Nixon dated June<br />

30, 1972.

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