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-334- A Historical Analysis of Cadre a better resourced Army Reserve (formerly the Organized Reserve) through the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. The Organized Reserve was no longer a cadre force. In the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara led reforms to increase the readiness of all reserve units and eventually eliminated all Army Reserve combat units. These changes gradually eliminated any remaining cadre units that existed in the U.S. Army. 7.2.1—Reserve Forces Act of 1955 The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 ended the existence of the Organized Reserves as a cadre force. With the passage of this act, the Army Reserve (formerly the Organized Reserves) was to increase its personnel levels to near one-hundred percent of authorized strength. This change occurred because the cadre structure of Army Reserve units prior to 1955 was seen by many as a major deficiency of the American military system. Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevins testified to Congress: “our reserve at the present is inadequate to meet our needs. Its inadequacy is due primarily –yes, I can say almost solely- to the failure to procure the participation of enlisted personnel in adequate numbers in organized units.” 220 The desire for high readiness reserve units was driven by the need to have a large pool of trained manpower available quickly to defend against a Soviet invasion of Europe. 221 This marked the end of explicit planning for cadre units in American military policy. However, Crossland and Currie note that even with this new policy, the Army Reserve entered the 1960s under strength. 222 ____________ 220 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 122 221 Many military professionals such as John McAuley Palmer had argued since 1945 that “technological advances … had eliminated the grace of time and distance that had in the past permitted the nation the opportunity to mobilize its untrained citizenry. Modern warfare needed a huge reservoir of trained men.” [Stewart (2005b), p. 210]. Therefore, a reserve force with higher readiness was necessary. 222 Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 134
-335- A Historical Analysis of Cadre 7.2.2—McNamara Reforms When Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense in 1961, noted defense analyst William Kaufman argues that McNamara concluded quickly that “not only did the reserve structure make very little sense in terms of size, [but that] its mission was obscure to say the least.” 223 McNamara made a number of recommendations including cutting four National Guard and four Army Reserve Divisions, assigning some of the remaining reserve units as “high-priority” units, and merging the Army Reserve and National Guard. 224 Weigley argues that McNamara’s proposals were based on the premise “that the Army must have … National Guard and Army Reserve units really prepared for quick reinforcement of the active Army.” 225 McNamara’s plans were not fully implemented, though he was able to get support for moving all combat units out of the Army Reserve and into the National Guard. 226 From this point onward, the Army Reserve, formerly known as the Organized Reserve, would maintain only Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units and these would no longer be under strength cadre units. 227 ____________ 223 Kaufman (1964), p. 64 224 Weigley (1984), p. 532 225 Weigley (1984), p. 532 226 McNamara’s proposal for integrating the Army Reserve and National Guard was rejected. His compromise was eliminating all combat units from the Army Reserve. [Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 165-177] 227 “The manning levels of Army Reserve units increased from the 66-70 percent level in 1960 to 93-100 percent as the decade ended.” [Crossland and Currie (1984), p. 183]
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THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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Considering a Cadre Augmented Army
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- iii - PREFACE This dissertation e
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- vii - SUMMARY This dissertation c
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- ix - the similarities and differe
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- xiii - ACRONYMS Symbol AC AIT ARF
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-1- Introduction Introduction This
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-3- Introduction ability to rotate
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-5- Introduction In a force designe
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-7- Introduction increasing militar
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-9- Introduction peacetime have bee
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-11- Introduction forces. This is i
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-14- A Budgetary Analysis of Cadre
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Page 393 and 394: -377- Conclusion Conclusion This di
Page 395 and 396: -379- Bibliography Bibliography Ada
Page 397 and 398: -381- Bibliography Carter, William
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-385- Bibliography Garamone, Jim,
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-387- Bibliography Howze, Hamilton
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-389- Bibliography Michie, Peter Sm
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-391- Bibliography Stewart, Richard
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-393- Bibliography Vick, Alan, Davi
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